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The Legacy of Geographical Morality
and Colonialism: A Historical




This Article examines the legacy of the rule of
geographical morality-that is, the norm by which a citizen of
a country in the North may engage in acts of corruption in any
country in the South, including bribery and extortion, without
the attachment of any moral condemnation to those acts. Part
I of the Article begins by reviewing the impeachment trial of
Warren Hastings, who served as the Governor of Bengal from
1772 until 1785, on charges of bribery and corruption. It was
during that impeachment proceeding when the words
"principle of geographical morality" were used to described
Hastings' defense.
Part fi of the Article then examines the revisionist approach
of social scientists first developed in the 1960s. The revisionists
embraced moral relativism and concentrated on external causes
of corruption instead of individual moral shortcomings. This
approach perpetuated the rule of geographical morality by
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allowing multinational corporations to hide behind "culture" as
the reason for their participation in corrupt business
transactions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Ne4 the
Article evaluates the recent post-Cold War discourse on
corruption and bribery, which rejects geographical morality by
adhering to a universal standard of conduct.
In Part IV, the Author discusses regional and global legal
initiatives against corruption from the 1970s to the present.
These initiatives seek to eliminate the rule of geographical
morality by requiring uniform standards of conduct by private
and public officials, irrespective of geography. The Article
concludes with a discussion of the legacy of geographical
morality and its divisive impact on the current anti-corruption
discourse.
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The servants of the nation are to render their services without any
taking ofpresents .... To form your judgment and then abide by it
is no easy task, and 'tis a man's surest course to give loyal
obedience to the law which commands 'do no service for a present.'
The disobedient shall, if convicted, die without ceremony. -Plato.
1
1. PLATO, THE LAWS 349 (A.E. Taylor trans., Aldine Press 1960).
20001
880 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33:877
In recent years, the international anti-corruption 2 campaign
has achieved unprecedented momentum and rhetorical success.
3
Under the legal definition of corruption, a bribe must result in a
breach of some sort of a fiduciary duty or trust.4 Nonetheless,
corruption is both a legal and a moral concept as it is possible for
a corrupt act to be improper without being unlawful. Anti-
corruption advocates argue that systemic corruption at all levels
of government, particularly in the form of bribes, is a major
impediment to economic development in the South5 as well as
being a threat to democracy, democratic values, and the rule of
law.6 This Article does not address the accuracy of such claims,
nor does it question the laudable motives of those who engage in
such discourse and pursue the current anti-corruption agenda.
2. This article uses the following definition of corruption: "The act of doing
something with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty
and the rights of others; a fiduciary's or official's use of a station or office to
procure some benefit either personally or for someone else, contrary to the rights
of others." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 348 (7th ed. 1999).
3. Since 1996, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) all have adopted anti-corruption policies and
established anti-corruption task forces. Specifically, in June 1996 the World
Bank announced revisions to its procurement guidelines to guard against
corruption in World Bank projects. At the end of March 1996 the Organization for
American States (OAS) approved the Inter-American Convention against
Corruption, which was subsequently ratified. See infra Part IV. In December
1997 the 29 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), together with five non-members, signed the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions. See infra Part IV. In March 1996 the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) adopted a report that proposes strict rules of conduct
for corporate self-regulation. In December 1996 the United Nations General
Assembly approved a declaration against corruption. See discussion infra Part IV.
In December 1996 the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed at its first
ministerial meeting in Singapore to undertake a study of transparency and due
process in the award of government procurement contracts. Also, Transparency
International (TI), a non-governmental organization based in Berlin, was
established in 1993 to combat international corruption. Today it has national
chapters throughout the world.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 348.
5. The author has struggled with the terms developing and developed,
East and West, North and South. None of these terms is entirely satisfactory, but
since today the gap between rich and poor nations in terms of economic
development is most commonly referred to as the North-South divide, this Article
has adopted those terms. The term "North" is used to refer to Western developed
nations and the former colonial powers. The term "South" refers to the developing
or least developed nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
6. See generally GEORGE MOODY-STUART, GRAND CORRUPTION: How
BUSINESS BRIBES DAMAGE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1997) (examining grand
corruption and the manner in which it affects Third World development). See also
ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988); TRANSPARENCY INT'L & ECON.
DEV. INST., WORLD BANK, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMBATING CORRUPTION (1998).
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Instead, this Article argues that given the fact that anti-
corruption rhetoric has played a significant role in the
international economic and political relations between the
developed North and the developing South, it is imperative that
the current anti-corruption campaign appreciate why past
multilateral attempts at combating corruption at the United
Nations and elsewhere have been unsuccessful and have been
viewed with skepticism by the peoples and governments of the
developing South. Specifically, this Article argues that one legacy
of colonialism-the "rule of geographical morality"-has infected
the discussion of transnational corruption and bribery. The "rule
of geographical morality"7 is defined as the norm by which a
citizen of a country in the North may engage in acts of corruption
in any country in the South, including bribery and extortion,
without the attachment of any moral condemnation to those acts.
It has been one of the bases by which the North has justified
exploitation of the South. More importantly, the rule of
geographical morality is based on a world view that non-
Christian, non-Western, and non-white individuals are
fundamentally immoral and corrupt when measured by European
standards. This Article will explore how the rule of geographical
morality and its attendant world view continue to haunt the anti-
corruption discourse, making, from the perspective of the South,
any discourse on the subject of corruption-even one aimed at
discrediting geographical morality-inherently suspect.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I reviews the facts,
circumstances, and outcome of the impeachment trial of Warren
Hastings, who served from 1772 until 1785 as the first Governor
of Bengal, on charges of bribery and corruption. This example
was chosen partly because the details of the proceedings are
relatively accessible-thanks to the "Works" of Edmund Burke-
and partly because it demonstrates the complex and multifaceted
legacy of colonialism, which resists generalizations. 8 This Article
will show that the issues raised during that impeachment trial,
centuries ago, continue to be relevant today to the discourse on
corruption and bribery in international business. Part II reviews
the evolution of the discourse on corruption and bribery from one
7. The term "geographical morality" was first coined by Edmund Burke to
characterize the defense of Warren Hastings on charges of bribery and corruption
in British India. Edmund Burke, Speech in General Reply in the Impeachment of
Warren Hastings, in 9 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 447
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1889). Specifically, Hastings argued that "actions in
Asia," including bribery, "do not bear the same moral qualities which the same
actions would bear in Europe." Id.
8. This example was not selected because British rule in India was, within
the colonial context, particularly egregious, nor to suggest that Warren Hastings
was the most corrupt colonial official.
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based on "morality" to one intentionally divorced from morality.
Specifically, this part reviews the moralist approach and the
successor amoral "revisionist" approach developed by social
scientists in the 1960s, which rejected a priori moral judgments,
embraced cultural relativism, and concentrated on external
causes of corruption instead of individual moral shortcomings.
Part III explores the more recent, post-Cold War discourse on
corruption and bribery, which rejects the revisionist thesis and
cultural relativism. This modern approach emphasizes that
globalization dictates rejecting geographical morality by adhering
to a universal standard of conduct in international business that
applies to both the North and South.9 This current discourse has
inherited the universalism of the moralist discourse on corruption
and combined it with the revisionist reliance on empirical and
economic data. This approach to corruption also emphasizes the
external (revisionist) explanations for corruption-for example,
non-democratic institutions, economic underdevelopment, and
weak judiciaries. But it has also begun to accept the internal
(moralist) explanations for corruption, i.e., lack of integrity and
ethical standards among public officials. Part IV discusses the
current multilateral initiatives against corruption and bribery
undertaken by the United Nations, the Organization of American
States (OAS), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Importantly, these initiatives seek to
eliminate the rule of geographical morality by requiring uniform
standards of conduct by private and public officials, irrespective
of geography. This section of the Article attributes the past
failures of multilateral or transnational initiatives to the legacy of
colonialism and geographical morality, which have sown the
seeds of distrust between the North and the South. Part V
concludes by looking at the unique challenge that the legacy of
the rule of geographical morality and its attendant world view
poses for the current anti-corruption campaign.
9. See generally Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in
Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257 (1999) (analyzing
transnational bribery in the context of current global conditions and concluding
that practical and moral considerations require prohibition of transnational
bribery).
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I. THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS AND THE RULE OF
GEOGRAPHICAL MORALITY
Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
-Lord Acton
In 1787 the British House of Commons impeached Warren
Hastings on charges of corruption and bribery during his tenure
as the Governor-General of Bengal from 1772-85.10 Eight years
later, in 1795, the British House of Lords acquitted Warren
Hastings of all charges." Regardless of the outcome, the record
of the seven-year impeachment proceedings is a good starting
point for our study of the discourse on corruption and bribery
and the impact of colonialism on that discourse.
A. The Prosecution's Case Against Warren Hastings
Edmund Burke led the prosecution against Hastings 12 and
was assisted by Richard Sheridan, among others.' 3  The
prosecution not only argued that Hastings had engaged in simple
acts of bribery, but also that he had created a system of
government which was corrupt and whose sole purpose was to
exercise "arbitrary power" to plunder India without restraint or
respect for the rule of law.14 Burke described this corrupt system
of government during his opening speech before the House of
Lords as follows:
We wish your Lordships distinctly to consider that he did not only
give and receive bribes accidentally, as it happened, without any
system and design, merely as the opportunity or momentary
temptation of profit urged him to it, but that he has formed plans
and systems of government for the very purpose of accumulating
bribes and presents to himself.16
10. RUSSELL KIRK, EDMUND BURKE: A GENIUS RECONSIDERED 116 (rev. ed.
1988).
11. Id. at 125.
12. The impeachment process occupied sixteen years of Burke's life, which
he himself described as a time when "I laboured with the most assiduity and met
with the least success." Id. at 104.
13. Richard Sheridan, a famous playwright, was recruited by Burke for his
oratory skills. In fact, Sheridan made two of his most famous speeches during the
impeachment trial of Warren Hastings. FINTAN OTOOLE, A TRAITOR'S KISS: THE LIFE
OF RICHARD BRINSLEY SHERIDAN 225-34 (1998).
14. KIRK, supra note 10, at 117.
15. Edmund Burke, Speech in Opening, in 10 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT
HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 7 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1889).
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Burke later described Hastings as "not only a public robber
himself, but the head of a system of robbery, the captain-general
of the gang...."16
As part of this "systemic corruption," Burke argued, Hastings
had enlisted the help of both Englishmen and native Indians. 17
Specifically, Hastings had enlisted Indians or "blacks," as his
agents for corrupt acts of bribery more often than "whites"
because they were more vulnerable and less likely to challenge
him.' 8 According to the prosecution, Hastings' corrupt system of
government had depended on the cooperation of "black tyrants"
who were "scattered throughout the country," but all of whom
reported in the last instance to a European. Hastings and his
"white" agents had controlled the "black natives" who took part in
the first instance in the acts of corruption and bribery: 19
Governors, we know very well, cannot with their own hands be
continually receiving bribes .... As there are many offices, so he
has had various officers for receiving and distributing his bribes; he
has a great many, some white and some black agents. The white
men are loose and licentious; they are apt to have resentments,
and to be bold in revenging them. The black men are very secret
and mysterious; they are not apt to have very quick resentments,
they have not the same liberty and boldness of language which
characterize Europeans; and they have fears, too, for themselves,
which makes it more likely that they will conceal anything
committed to them by Europeans. Therefore Mr. Hastings had his
black agents, not one, two, three, but many, disseminated through
the country: no two of them, hardly, appear to be in the secret of
any one bribe. He has had likewise his white agents,-they were
necessary,-a Mr. Larkins and a Mr. Croftes. Mr. Croftes was sub-
treasurer, and Mr. Larkins accountant-general. These were the
last persons of all others that should have had anything to do with
bribes .... 20
In other words, as Governor-General, Hastings had set up a
system whereby Indians of questionable character were recruited
to extort payments and gifts from Indian princes and princesses
and other nobility for the ultimate benefit of Hastings and his
cronies. The amounts of these tributes, or bribes, had been
16. Edmund Burke, Speech in Reply, in 11 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT
HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 175 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1889) (citing Burke's
impeachment speech of May 28, 1794).
17. Burke, supra note 15, at 14.
18. Id. at 18. Specifically, Hastings promoted "Calcutta banians" to whom
he had given all the farm land in India that his government had confiscated. Id.
19. Id. at 14. "The whole formed a system together, through the succession of
black tyrants scattered throughout the country, in which you at last find the
European at the end .... So that the zemindars were dispossessed, the country
racked and ruined, for the benefit of an European, under the name of a farmer....
It. at 18.
20. Burke, supra note 15, at 14.
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subject to the arbitrary whim of the Governor-General and had
depended, in a large part, on the condition of the treasury and
the financial situation of the East India Company. 21
Hastings not only received bribes but also gave bribes to his
agents, both English and Indian, "white" and "black." It was the
prosecution's claim that in safeguarding the corrupt system of
government he had put into place in India, Hastings was very
generous to his allies and shared with them the looting and
plundering of India, while at the same time, he was cruel and
repressive to those who criticized his actions and accused him of
corruption, particularly if they were Indians.22
The bribes Hastings received, Burke argued, were on such a
large scale that they supported a very lavish lifestyle in India and
allowed Hastings to accumulate a large personal fortune for his
retirement.23 The prosecution showed that during his tenure as
the Governor-General of the Bengal, Hastings' salary was "1000
times the income of a man in genteel poverty and at least seven
times as much as a major official in [Britain]."24 Notwithstanding
the enormous official remuneration that Hastings had received
during this tenure in India, during his last two years of
governorship alone, he had spent £10,000 more than his
salary.2S In addition, the prosecution introduced evidence that
Hastings had remitted to England at least £218,527 during his
tenure, which was considered an "extremely large" amount of
money even by the standards of fortunes made in India.26
Burke argued that the crime of bribery, when exercised by "a
chief governor of a great empire" who is "receiving bribes from
21. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 395 (1984) ("By the 1780s the Company
was not in flourishing condition."). See also Burke, supra note 15, at 47 (stating
that Hastings was extorting "all for the good of the dear East India Company").
See, e.g., 2 THOMAS MOORE, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF THE RT. HON. RICHARD BRINSLEY
SHERIDAN 7 (Greenwood Press 1968) (1858) (Hastings, "finding the treasury of the
Company in a very exhausted state, resolved to sacrifice this unlucky Rajah to
their replenishment; and having, as a preliminary step, imposed upon him a
mulet of £500,000, set out immediately for his capital, Benares, to compel the
payment of it.").
22. The prosecution brought forth witnesses to prove that Hastings had
conspired with Sir Elijah Impey, M.P. and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in
Calcutta, India, in order to bring about the "judicial murder" of an opponent of
Hastings in Bengal, Maharajah Nundcomar, who had accused Hastings of
corruption. The Maharajah was hanged for forgery in August 1775. Burke, supra
note 15, at 24-30; John Riddy, Warren Hastings: Scotland's Benefactor?, in THE
IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS: PAPERS FROM A BICENTENARY COMMEMORATION
30, 31 (Geoffrey Carnell & Colin Nicholson eds., 1989).
23. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 396.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 396, 397. It was also reported that upon Hastings' return to
England, the Prince of Wales applied to him for a £200,000 loan. Id. at 396.
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poor, miserable, indigent people," is more than just a dirty and
morally reprehensible act; it makes the "government itself base,
contemptible, and odious in the eyes of mankind."27 Therefore,
Burke argued, as a representative of the British Empire, Hastings
had tainted Britain's reputation for intolerance of political and
judicial corruption:
This [corrupt] system of Mr. Hastings' government is such a one, I
believe, as the British nation in particular will disown; for I will
venture to say, that, if there is any one thing which distinguishes
this nation eminently above another, it is, that in its offices at
home, both judicial and in the state, there is less suspicion of
pecuniary corruption attaching to them than to any similar offices
... so that he who would set up a system of corruption, and
attempt to justify it upon the principle of utility, that man is staining
not only the nature and character of office, but that which is the
peculiar glory of the official and judicial character of this country; and
therefore, in this House, which is eminently the guardian of the purity
of all the offices of this kingdom, he ought to be called eminently and
peculiarly to account
2 8
In addition to arguing that conviction of Hastings was
necessary to safeguard the reputation of the British nation,
Burke invoked the authority of the church and Christian values:
My Lords, you have here also the lights of our religion .... You
have the representatives of that religion which says that their God
is love, that the very vital spirit of their institution is charity,-a
religion which so much hates oppression, that, when the God
whom we adore appeared in human form, He did not appear in a
form of greatness and majesty, but in sympathy with the lowest of
the people, and thereby made it a firm and ruling principle that
their welfare was the object of all government, since the Person who
was the Master of Nature chose to appear Himself in a subordinate
situation.2 9
Finally, Burke appealed to the self-interest of the Members of
the House of Lords, warning that if they did not punish Hastings,
the corruption then in India would come home to England and
ruin British society. Burke suggested that many others like
Warren Hastings were waiting for the chance to come back to
England and corrupt the political system:
Our liberty is as much in danger as our honor and our national
character .... To-day the Commons of Great Britain prosecute the
delinquents of India: to-morrow the delinquents of India may be the
Commons of Great Britain. We know, I say, and feel the force of
money; and we now call upon your Lordships for justice in this
cause of money. We call upon you for the preservation of our
manners, of our virtues. We call upon you for our national
27. Burke, supra note 15, at 7.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 143-44.
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character. We call upon you for our liberties; and hope that the
freedom of the Commons will be preserved by the justice of the
Lords.
3 0
B. The Defense of Warren Hastings
Hastings never denied receiving payments.3 ' In his defense,
he first invoked what Burke called "geographical morality,"
meaning "actions in Asia do not bear the same moral qualities
which the same actions would bear in Europe."3 2 It was true that
he had exercised arbitrary power, Hastings said, but that type of
power had been thrust upon him because despotism was the only
form of government that existed in Asia.3 3 Arbitrary power,
Hastings argued, was in the "constitution of Asia."3 4 According to
the defense, the peoples of Hindustan knew nothing but
"arbitrary power," and Hastings, as Governor-General, had been
obliged to behave in ways that were disagreeable to him.3 5
Hastings maintained that he had not created the corrupt system
of government in India, as the prosecutors had charged, but
merely inherited it:
Every part of Hindostan has been constantly exposed to these and
similar disadvantages ever since the Mahomedan conquests. The
Hindoos, who never incorporated with their conquerors, were kept
in order only by the strong hand of power .... [R]ebellion itself is
the parent and promoter of despotism. Sovereignty in India implies
nothing else .... The whole history of Asia is nothing more than
precedents to prove the invariable exercise of arbitrary power.
3 6
Therefore, the defense argued, it would be unfair to judge
Hastings' actions in India by the moral standards applicable to
public officials in Britain.3 7 The implication of this assertion was
that the peoples of India did not deserve the same kind of
government as the people of Britain; indeed, that they were
incapable of understanding anything other than despotism.
30. Id. at 450-51. Burke's concern that the political system of England
was in danger of contamination was also shared by Blackstone, although
Blackstone attributed the source of this contamination to the peoples of the East.
NOONAN, supra note 21, at 400. Burke, on the other hand, blamed the corruption
on Europeans.
31. See KIRK, supra note 10, at 116 (stating that Hastings believed he
possessed an "arbitrary power" to do as he thought best).
32. Burke, supra note 7, at 447.
33. See id. at 453-54.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 448.
36. Id. at 451.
37. Id. at 447.
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Hastings' second line of defense was that the payments he
had received from the Indian princes were used not for his own
benefit, but for the benefit of the East India Company.3 8
Hastings based his argument on the covenant he had entered
into with the East India Company which prohibited servants of
the Company from taking gifts in excess of £100 for their own
private benefit. 39 The implication was that Hastings was not
precluded from accepting presents, so long as they were used for
the Company's benefit.
Hastings' third line of defense was that his extraordinary
services and successes on behalf the British Empire clearly
outweighed whatever questionable acts he may have engaged in,
including the taking and giving of bribes.4 ° Hastings had saved
British India after the collapse of Tartar rule and had helped to
consolidate the power of the East India Company. Given the
enormous value of his services, his defense argued, it would be
wrong to punish him for his slight transgressions. 4 1
C. Burke's Response to the Defense
Burke rejected with great disdain what he called the
"geographical morality" of Hastings and his defenders.4 2 It was
morally repugnant to Burke that a British subject should argue
that he was free from all moral restraints once in a non-Christian
society. Burke addressed this early in his opening speech before
the House of Commons:
[Ylour Lordships know that these gentlemen have formed a plan of
geographical morality, by which the duties of men, in public and
private situations, are not to be governed by their relation to the
great Governor of the Universe, or by their relation to mankind, but
by climates . . . latitudes: as if, when you crossed the equinoctial,
all the virtues die ... by which they unbaptize themselves of all
that they learned in Europe .... This geographical morality we do
protest against; Mr. Hastings shall not screen himself under
it .... 43
Burke went on to invoke the universal application of laws of
morality, contending that such values apply to all men,
irrespective of geography:
38. Burke, supra note 15, at 43.
39. Id. But see NOONAN, supra note 21, at 399 (stating "By covenant with
the Company in 1767.... Hastings had sworn to accept ... no more than 400
pounds as reward or gift...").
40. See KIRK, supra note 10, at 107. See also Burke, supra note 15, at 46-
47.
41. KIRK, supra note 10, at 107-14; NOONAN, supra note 21, at 409.
42. Burke, supra note 7, at 447.
43. Id. at 447-48.
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But we think it necessary, in justification of ourselves, to declare
that the laws of morality are the same everywhere, and that there is
no action which would pass for an act of extortion, of peculation, of
bribery, and of oppression in England, that is not an act of
extortion, of peculation, of bribery, and oppression in Europe, Asia,
Africa and all the world over. This I contend for not in the technical
forms of it, but I contend for it in the substance.
4 4
Burke summarized Hastings' justification of his despotic behavior
as follows: "To be robbed, violated, oppressed, is their privilege.
Let the constitution of their country answer for it .... Slaves I
found them, and as slaves I have treated them. I was a despotic
prince."4 5
Importantly, Burke rejected Hastings' argument that
"despotism is the constitution of any country in Asia" by stating
that this was "certainly not true of any Mahomedan
constitution."4 6  Not wanting to pursue that argument any
further, however, Burke asked, even if it were true, "[D]o your
Lordships really think that the nation would bear, that any
human creature would bear, to hear an English governor defend
himself on such principles?" 4 7 Burke concluded that corrupt
practices of mankind, no matter how prevalent, cannot be made
principles of government as Mr. Hastings attempted to do.4
8
D. The Acquittal of Warren Hastings
In the end, Burke's high-minded appeal to principles of
natural justice, universal morality, and Christian virtue were
rejected. The House of Lords acquitted Warren Hastings of all
charges in 1795. 4 9 The House of Lords held that Burke had not
been able to prove "a corrupt, habitual, evil intention" as was
required for the crime of bribery.5 0 The payments Hastings had
received from his Indian subjects may have been questionable,
but they did not rise to the level of corruption.
Unfortunately, Burke's greatest mistake may have been his
religious argument that there was a universal moral standard
transcending geography and his claim that under principles of
natural laws ' all men, irrespective of complexion, deserved
44. Id. at 448.
45. Id. at 453.
46. Id. at 454.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 454-55.
49. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 393.
50. Id. at 413.
51. Peter Stanlis observed that Burke "certainly believed that the Natural
Law applied equally in India and in England; he admitted that Hastings had
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protection.5 2  For Burke, the "Indians without English
complexions were his clients because they were made in the
image of God."5 3
The acquittal, however, should not have surprised Burke.
Popular sentiment was against him from the very beginning. In
fact, Burke was criticized widely for leading the impeachment of
Hastings.5 4 This is evident from Burke's letter to a Miss Palmer,
who had written him to tell him of such criticism:
I have no party in this Business, my dear Miss Palmer, but among
a set of people who have none of your Lilies and Roses in their
faces, but who are images of the great Pattern as well as you and I.
I know what I am doing; whether the white people like it or not.
5 5
Even Burke's relative, William Burke, who lived in India and had
provided Burke with evidence of Hastings' acts of bribery and
corruption, sided with Hastings during the impeachment, as
evidenced in a letter he wrote to Edmund's son, Richard:
"The English here are a respectable, humane, friendly people, nor
can I for the Soul of me feel as your father does for the Black
Primates." Was it necessary to alienate Englishmen of high
influence in order to bring justice to those who never had known
equity among themselves-to these rascally black natives of
Madras? "Do say for me to your father that the abstract right of
things in the East has scarcely an existence; all is Usurpation and
Force.
5 6
William Burke's view of Indians as "rascally black natives" and
Eastern culture as "all Usurpation and Force" continues to
suggest that Hastings' view of Asian societies as inherently
despotic and corrupt was widely shared among his countrymen.
Even if not surprised, Edmund Burke was outraged that the
House of Lords acquitted Hastings, writing the following during
the last year of his life: s 7
brought disgrace upon Britain's honor by violating the law of nations in Asia."
PETER J. STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW 88 (1958).
52. In Burke's Speech to the House of Lords on Feb. 16, 1788, he
proclaimed: 'We are all born in subjection .... all born equally, high and low,
governours and governed, in subjection to one great, immutable, pre-existent law,
prior to all our devices, and prior to all our contrivances, paramount to all our
ideas, and all our sensations, antecedent to our very existence, by which we are
knit and connected in the eternal frame of the Universe, out of which we cannot
stir." KIRK, supra note 10, at 118.
53. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 422.
54. 1 MOORE, supra note 21, at 288.
55. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 422.
56. KIRK, supra note 10, at 113.
57. Id. at 115 ("Burke knew that he could not succeed in securing the
conviction of the Governor-General.").
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Let not this cruel, daring, unexampled act of publick corruption,
guilt, and meanness, go down to a posterity, perhaps as careless as
the present race, without its due animadversion, which will be best
found in its own acts and monuments. Let my endeavours to save
the Nation from that shame and guilt, be my monument; The only
one I ever will have. Let every thing I have done, said, or written,
be forgotten but this. I have struggled with the great and little on
this point during the greater part of my active life; and I wish after
death, to have my defiance of the judgments of those, who consider
the dominion of the glorious Empire given by an incomprehensible
dispensation of the Divine Providence into our hands, as nothing
more than an opportunity for gratifying, for the lowest of their
purposes, the lowest of their passions-and that for such poor
rewards, and for the most part, indirect and silly bribes, as indicate
even more the folly than the corruption of these infamous and
contemptible wretches .... Above all make out the cruelty of this
pretended acquittal, but in reality this barbarous and inhuman
condemnation of whole tribes and nations, and of all the classes they
contain. If ever Europe recovers its civilization, that work will be
usefuL Remember! Remember! Remember!5 8
In prosecuting Hastings, Burke had subscribed to two
fundamental principles. First, there is only one morality
applicable to all men.5 9 This morality dictates that bribery is a
sin which must be punished and from which all men, as God's
children, deserve to be protected, particularly if bribery is
practiced in abuse of public office. 60 Second, "merit cannot
extinguish crime,"6 1-that is, services Hastings may have
rendered to, and on behalf of, the British nation, did not trump
his crime of accepting bribes and betraying the public trust. The
acquittal of Warren Hastings meant the defeat of both principles.
It was a victory of "geographical morality" over "universal
morality." The House of Lords' acquittal of Hastings-after he had
admitted to many of the charges against him-meant that a
different and much lower standard of conduct was permissible so
long as corrupt acts by British citizens took place outside Britain
and for the benefit of the Empire. Implicit in that was the
acceptance of the view that Asian countries constitutionally
required despotic rulers and subscribed to lower standards of
morality, particularly with regard to the duties owed by a
sovereign to his people. Moreover, the acquittal was a victory of
58. Id. at 126-127 (emphasis added). Burke requested a Dr. Laurence to
formally document the proceedings since Burke was too far gone to do it himself.
Id. at 126. See also Conor Cruise O'Brien, Warren Hastings in Burke's Great
Melody, in THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS: PAPERS FROM A BICENTENARY
COMMEMORATION, supra note 22, at 65 (stating that Burke acknowledged that he
was motivated by what he called "sympathetic revenge").
59. Burke, supra note 7, at 447-48.
60. See generally Burke, supra note 15, at 143-44. See also supra text
accompanying note 27.
61. KIRK, supra note 10, at 121.
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"economic success" over qualms about "tyranny." In other words,
tyranny over non-Europeans would be tolerated if it was
economically successful and if the European colonizing nation
benefited from that economic success. Thomas Moore addressed
this point in his relatively contemporary biography of Richard
Brinsley Sheridan:
Success ... was the dazzling talisman, which he [Hastings] waved
in the eyes of his adversaries from the first, and which his friends
have made use of to throw a splendor over his tyranny and
injustice ever since. Too often in the moral logic of this world, it
matters but little what the premises of conduct may be, so the
conclusion but turns out showy and prosperous. There is also, it
must be owned, among the English, (as perhaps, among all free
people,) a strong taste for the arbitrary, when they themselves are
not to be the victim of it, which invariably secures to such
accomplished despotisms, as that of Lord Strafford in Ireland, and
Hastings in India, even a larger share of their admiration than they
are, themselves, always willing to allow.
6 2
E. The Aftermath
Even before the impeachment of Warren Hastings, the British
government had decided to curb corruption among servants of
the East India Company. 63 Specifically, Charles Cornwallis, who
became the Governor-General of Bengal during the impeachment
proceedings, was instructed to "cleanse the establishment from
corruption, and to revise the system into which the corruption
had grown."6 4 Integral to Cornwallis' anti-corruption reform was
the purging of Indians from all government posts and embarking
on the "Europeanization of the [civil] services" in India.65
Cornwallis reasoned that natives of Hindustan were incapable of
not being corrupt.6 6  For example, he is reported to have
remarked: "[e]very native of India, I verily believe, is corrupt."67
Purging of Indians from positions of authority as part of the
anti-corruption effort was singularly emphasized when it came to
the reform of the judiciary and administration of criminal justice.
This view is made clear in a letter written by Cornwallis on
August 2, 1789 in which he states: "[All regulations for the
62. 2 MOORE, supra note 21, at 36.
63. 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA 431-43 (H.H. Dodwell ed., First
Indian Reprint 1958) (discussing the instructions to Cornwallis, the Governor-
General of Bengal, to reform the abuses among the Company's servants, including
the close monitoring of the ways in which they grew rich).
64. Id. at 441.
65. 2 PERCIVAL SPEAR, A HISTORY OF INDIA 95 (1965).
66. Id. See also NOONAN, supra note 21, at 416.
67. SPEAR, supra note 65, at 95.
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reform of that [criminal justice] department would be useless and
nugatory whilst the execution of them depends upon any native
whatever .... We ought not, I think, to leave the future control
of so important a branch of government to the sole discretion of
any Native. .. ."68 In other words, Cornwallis, just like Hastings
before him, subscribed to the world view supporting the rule of
geographical morality, the difference being that while Hastings
used geographical morality to justify rampant corruption,
Cornwallis used its attendant racist world view to justify purging
Indian natives from positions of authority as part of the anti-
corruption reforms. This is a vivid example of how anti-
corruption reforms have been used to pursue racist,
discriminatory practices that were integral to colonial rule.
The impact of "geographical morality" and the view of non-
Christian cultures as morally inferior remained such an integral
part of the discourse on corruption and bribery that, more than a
hundred years later, Max Weber, one of the greatest minds of our
time and the father of modern sociology, attempted to explain the
rampant corruption in primitive non-Western cultures as follows:
The universal reign of absolute unscrupulousness in the pursuit of
selfish interests by the making of money has been a specific
characteristic of precisely those countries whose bourgeois-
capitalistic development, measured according to Occidental
standards, has remained backward .... Absolute and conscious
ruthlessness in acquisition has often stood in the closest
connection with the strictest conformity to tradition.
6 9
The next part of this Article shows that those who wrote
about the problem of corruption in the newly independent states
in the de-colonization period did not separate the discourse of
corruption from the legacy of colonialism. To the contrary, they
facilitated the rule of geographical morality and its worldview, in
the name of culture.
68. 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA, supra note 63, at 445 (emphasis
added).
69. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIc AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM, 57, 58
(Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge 1997) (1930). Although Weber did not directly
address the fact that tolerance of bribery and corruption may be influenced by
biology or race, he admitted that he was, as a general rule, "inclined to think the
importance of biological heredity very great." Id. at 30. Weber analyzed that the
capitalistic ideal-the pursuit of forever-renewed profit by means of continuous,
rational, capitalistic enterprise as an end in itself and not as a means to enhance
life--was unique to Western civilization and owed much to the Protestant, and
particularly Calvinistic, work ethic although the impulse to acquire and pursue
gain had existed at all times and in all countries of the earth.
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II. THE MORALIST AND REVISIONIST APPROACHES TO CORRUPTION
AND THE CONTINUED ACCEPTANCE OF THE RULE OF
GEOGRAPHICAL MORALITY
A. The Moralist Approach
Prior to the 1960s all discussion of corruption and bribery
was based on a moralist perspective. Corruption was viewed first
as a moral failing and also, at times, as a violation of the dictates
of positive law, such as penal legislation against bribery. It has
specifically been argued that the concept of bribery is
fundamentally informed by religion, 70 which created in the first
instance the idea of a "transcendental Judge"7 1 immune from
ordinary reciprocities. 7 2 The moralist discourse on corruption
has been used by both those who condemned bribery in the
transnational context, such as Burke, and those who justified it,
such as Hastings.
The moralist approach to corruption and bribery dominated
the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings. In fact, throughout
the trial, the discourse on corruption was intertwined with moral
judgments. Burke felt compelled to press the impeachment of
Warren Hastings because he had hoped that "men might learn to
act under the compulsion of morality as well as positive law."73
Burke advocated the universal application of moral principles,
including standards of conduct against bribery. Hastings, on the
other hand, admitted that his actions were morally reprehensible
70. Interestingly Noonan questions whether religion is, in fact, so clear
when it comes to bribery. He suggests that the religious attitude towards bribery
and reciprocity is more ambivalent than categorical. NOONAN, supra note 21, at
xx-xxi.
71. In this regard, Noonan writes:
Reciprocity is so regularly the norm of human relations that the
conception of a transcendental figure, a Judge beyond the reach of
ordinary reciprocities, was of enormous importance for the idea that
certain reciprocities with earthly officials were intolerable. That conception
of a transcendental Judge was shaped in the ancient Near East.
Communication of this image to the West was largely dependent on
religion. Accepted as divine revelation, Scripture by commandment and
paradigm inculcated a teaching on impartial judgment. The concept of the
bribe was cast in a biblical mold.
Id. at 207.
72. See id. at xx-xxxi (exploring bribes in a religious context).
73. CARL B. CONE, BURKE AND THE NATURE OF POLITIcs: THE AGE OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 207(1964).
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but insisted he could not be moral in Asia, where notions of
morality did not exist. In other words, Hastings espoused
geographical limits on Christian morality.
Although Burke sided with the people of India by declaring
the universality of morality and Christian virtue, he did not spend
much time attacking Hastings' assertion that Asians were more
corrupt. Instead, Burke argued, even if Asians were
constitutionally corrupt and their government despotic, the
British nation, a Christian nation, has a duty not to act in a
morally reprehensible manner. 74 For Burke it was irrelevant that
prior cultures were despotic; an Englishman and a Christian
could not be.
In sum, the moralist approach lent itself to an a priori
condemnation of all non-Western and non-Christian societies and
cultures as morally inferior without any attempt to understand
the culture or religious traditions of the East.7 S  This
condemnation in turn was used by people like Warren Hastings
to justify despotic acts as being necessitated by the lower moral
standards of non-Western and non-Christian societies.
The morality-based approach to, and discourse on,
corruption and bribery was rejected by social scientists in the
74. Burke, supra note 15, at 454.
75. The lack of understanding of other cultures and peoples is reflected in
the first speech that Edmund Burke made to the House of Commons on December
1, 1783, comparing the English invasion of India to Tartar rule:
The Tartar invasion was mischievous; but it is our protection that destroys
India. It was their enmity, but it is our friendship. Our conquest there,
after twenty years, is as crude as it was the first day. The natives scarcely
know what it is to see the grey head of an Englishman. Young men (boys
almost) govern there, without society, and without sympathy with the
natives. They have no more social habits with the people, than if they still
resided in England; nor indeed any species of intercourse but that which is
necessary to making a sudden fortune, with a view to a remote settlement.
Animated by all the avarice of age, and all the impetuosity of youth, they
roll in one after another; wave after wave; and there is nothing before the
eyes of the natives but an endless, hopeless prospect of new flights of birds
of prey and passage, with appetites continually renewing for a food that is
continually wasting. Every rupee of profit made by an Englishman is lost
for ever to India. With us are no retributory superstitions, by which a
foundation of charity compensates, through ages, to the poor, for the
rapine and injustice of a day. With us no pride erects stately monuments
which repair the mischiefs which pride has produced, and which adorn a
country out of its own spoils.
KIRK, supra note 10, at 110. See also Burke, supra note 7, at 452-68 (explaining
the blanket condemnation of all non-Christian and non-Western nations by the
British).
2000]
896 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VoL. 33:877
1960s.7 6  These social scientists argued that the moralist
approach that dominated the discourse on corruption and bribery
at the time was unacceptable because it lacked a working
definition of corruption and relied on an a priori condemnation
based on moral principles. The dissatisfaction of social scientists
with the moralist approach, and the creation of the subsequent
revisionist approach to corruption and bribery, has been
described as follows:
For those interested in corruption as a social phenomenon, the
traditional approach, which treated it in a moralistic manner, was
inappropriate. Studies of corruption were vague as to definition,
condemned it a priori, and looked for explanations in individual
behavior. Social scientists demanded precise definitions, objectivity,
and some relationship between the workings of society and the
existence of corruption. Thus was born a "revisionist"
approach .... 77
B. The Revisionist Approach
The revisionist school of thought on corruption and bribery
developed during the decolonization period of the 1960s and
1970s. This approach is exemplified by the works of Samuel
Huntington, 78 J.S. Nye, 7 9 A.J. Heidenheimer, 80 and Nathaniel H.
Leff.8 1 The revisionists challenged the ipso facto condemnation of
corruption as something evil men did. 82  Contrary to the
traditional moralist approach, revisionism emphasized the
aunavoidable character of corruption at certain stages of
development and the contributions of the practice to processes of
modernization and development."8 3 The revisionists' definition of
corruption has been summarized as follows: "a 'revisionist'
76. See generally Gerald E. Calden & Naomi J. Caden, Administrative
Corruption, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 301 (1977) (exploring the revisionist theory in
administrative corruption).
77. Id. at 301.
78. E.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES
(1968) [hereinafter HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER]; Samuel P. Huntington,
Modernization and Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 377 (Arnold J.
Heidenheimer et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Huntington, Modernization and
Corruption].
79. E.g., J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417 (1967).
80. E.g., POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK (Arnold J. Heidenheimer et al.
eds., 1989).
81. E.g., Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic
Corruption, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST, Nov. 1964, at 8.
82. Gabriel Ben-Dor, Corruption, Institutionalization, and Political
Development: The Revisionist Theses Revisited, 62 COMP. POL. STUD. 63, 65 (1974).
83. Id.
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approach . . . defined corruption in terms of divergence from a
specific norm of accepted behavior, explained its existence by
reference to social mores and deficiencies in economic and
political systems, and enumerated conditions in which it might
elicit approval rather than condemnation."8 4 The most striking
feature of the revisionist definition is that it is intended to be
amoral. The revisionists used concepts from economics,
sociology, anthropology, and other social sciences to make two
arguments: (1) the definitions of corruption and bribery varied
with societal values and inherited cultural and religious
traditions, and (2) an increase in the incidence of corruption and
bribery was a necessary and inevitable part of the modernization
process.
Despite an overall unity of concepts which coalesce the
revisionist thought, their discourse on corruption in the
developing world has been divided into three different
approaches:8 5  (1) the functional-integrationist approach of
sociology and anthropology, (2) the economic-market approach,
and (3) the institutionalist approach, proposed by Samuel
Huntington.8 6
1. Functional-Integrationist Revisionists
The works of Merton,8 7 Bayley,8 8 Abueva,8 9 and Scott9 °
exemplify the functional-integrationist approach to political
corruption that drew largely upon the U.S. experience with
political machines in U.S. cities. The functional-integrationists
believed that corruption may contribute positively to development
when it allows the integration of various groups who otherwise
would not be able to participate in the political process. 9 1 They
84. Caiden & Caiden, supra note 76, at 30 1.
85. The three different approaches are set forth in Ben-Dor, supra note 82.
86. See generally HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER, supra note 78 (examining
the consequences of rapid social change, the emergence of new political groups,
and the slow development of political institutions).
87. E.g., ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (3d ed.
1968).
88. E.g., David H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation,
19 W. POL. Q. 719 (1966).
89. E.g., Jose Veloso Abueva, The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils and Graft
to Political Development, 3 E.-W. CENTER REV. 45 (1966).
90. E.g., James C. Scott, The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations,
11 COMP. STUD. Soc. & HIST. 315 (1969) [hereinafter Scott, Analysis of Corruption].
See also James C. Scott, Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change, 63 AM.
POL. Scl. REV. 1142 (1969) [hereinafter Scott, Corruption, Machine Politics, and
Political Change].
91. The functional-integrationists believed that political machines in the
United States had "satislied] otherwise unfulfilled needs of diverse groups in the
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saw corruption not only as giving the rich access to top-level
decision making, but also as giving ordinary citizens access to
lower levels of government bureaucracy. According to this school,
corruption at the "lower levels" of bureaucracy may have "an
important humanizing element," enabling ordinary people to
overcome their impotence in dealing with a "huge, impersonal
governmental apparatus."92 It is interesting to note that the
functional-integrationists believed that it may be better "that
people in developing nations misuse modern agencies to their
own ends than that they reject the new because they cannot work
the handles."
9 3
In sum, the functional-integrationists believed that low-level
corruption and bribery can play a useful and positive role in the
development process if it allows groups otherwise unrepresented
to participate. 9 4 They argued that low-level corruption can
"humanize" a bureaucracy and thereby lessen the chances that
the citizens of developing nations would challenge the new
bureaucratic institutions crucial for their development. 95 They
also recognized that in some societies, cultural practices that we
may consider "corrupt," may be closer to their traditional way of
doing things.9 6 Therefore, by integrating traditional ways of
interacting with governmental officials, e.g., gift-giving, we may
allow these new institutions to survive and gain acceptance.
9 7
population." MERTON, supra note 87, at 127. See generally id. at 124-36. See also
James Q. Wilson, Corruption Is Not Always Scandalous, in THEFT OF THE CITY:
READINGS ON CORRUPTION IN URBAN AMERICA 29 (John A. Gardiner & David J. Olson
eds., 1974) (arguing the need to take into account the circumstances and
consequences when evaluating the various forms of corruption).
92. Ben-Dor, supra note 82, at 72.
93. Bayley, supra note 88, at 729.
94. Ben-Dor, supra note 82, at 71-72.
95. Id. at 72.
96. See id. at 68-70.
97. Ben-Dor writes:
[C]orruption is said to contribute to integration by preventing the
alienation of various groups from the regime, or indeed society itself, by
enabling them to participate in the political process and by giving them a
chance to influence the making of decisions affecting them through means
they have always had and have learned to use well. This may be very
important ... for the ordinary citizen-voter who may be unfamiliar with
the complicated workings of a modem bureaucracy, but may well find
corruption on the lower levels of such a bureaucracy an important
humanizing element enabling him to take advantage of its machinery in a
way he knows well and which may help him overcome the feeling of
helplessness in the face of the huge, impersonal governmental apparatus.
Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).
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2. Economic-Market Revisionists
The works of Leff,98 Nye,9 9 Bayley, I0 0 and Scott'0 1 exemplify
the economic-market revisionist school. The economic-market
revisionists argued that corruption may introduce efficiency into
a system where there is none.1 0 2 The underlying problem they
saw was that, where government policies are imperfect,
government bureaucracy and regulation become overly
burdensome, inefficient, and replete with red tape. In addition,
specific acts of corruption, such as bribery, can allow
entrepreneurs to enter the market who otherwise would be
excluded. 103
In his often-quoted article, Corruption and Political
Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,'0 4 J.S. Nye not only
attacked the moralist analysis of corruption,' 0 5 but went on to
outline the possible benefits and costs of corruption and bribery.
The benefits of corruption that Nye identified were: (1) economic
development, because some kinds of corruption may be an
important source of capital formation, 10 6 (2) cutting of red-
98. E.g., Leff, supra note 81.
99. E.g., Nye, supra note 79.
100. E.g., Bayley, supra note 88.
101. E.g., Scott, Analysis of Corruption, supra note 90; Scott, Corruption,
Machine Politics, and Political Change, supra note 90.
102. Ben-Dor, supra note 82, at 70.
103. Ben-Dor suggests that:
[G]overnmental policies may be so imperfect that corruption may
systematically bring about better economic choices, that the private sector
will probably perform better than the governmental one when it can utilize
corruption to get around cumbersome regulations, that corruption may
enable innovators to introduce their innovations, that corruption money is
often diverted to investment rather than consumption, and that in fact the
ability of entrepreneurs to outbribe their competitors may well be a good
criterion of their efficiency ....
Id. (summarizing the assumptions on which Leff, Bayley, and Scott based their
arguments).
104. Nye, supra note 79.
105. Nye concluded:
What we need to advance the study of the problem [of interrelationship of
corruption and development] is to refute and replace specific a priori
hypotheses with propositions based on such data rather than with the
generalities of the moralists. Corruption in developing countries is too
important a phenomenon to be left to moralists.
Id. at 427.
106. Id. at 419-20. Nye recognizes, however, that the "real question is
whether the accumulated capital is then put to uses which promote economic
development or winds up in Swiss banks." Id. at 420.
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tape, l0 7 (3) encouragement of entrepreneurship and incentives by
allowing minority groups access to political decisions,1 0 8 (4)
national integration, particularly overcoming the divisions among
the ruling elites,' 0 9 as well as the integration of non-elites" ° as
the functional-integrationists argued, and (5) a preferable
alternative to violence."'
The costs of corruption that Nye identified were: (1) waste of
resources, including capital outflow and investment distortions,
(2) waste of skills and loss of foreign aid, and (3) political
instability caused by destroying the legitimacy of political
structures and by reducing the capacity of the government's
"modern-oriented" civil servants." 2 Finally, Nye developed a
"Corruption Cost-Benefit Matrix" for calculating the costs and
benefits of corruption in countries at various levels of
development 1 3 and concluded that "it is probable that the costs
of corruption in less developed countries will exceed its benefits
except for top level corruption involving modem inducements and
marginal deviations and except for situations where corruption
provides the only solution to an important obstacle to
development." 1 14 This is hardly a condemnation of corruption
and bribery. In Nye's view, the "important obstacle to
development" in newly independent states or former colonies is
107. Id.
108. Nye states that "[i]f Schumpeter is correct that the entrepreneur is a
vital factor in economic growth and if there is an ideological bias against private
incentives in a country, then corruption may provide one of the major means by
which a developing country can make use of this factor." Id. For example, in East
Africa, "corruption may be prolonging the effective life of an important economic
asset-the Asian minority entrepreneur-beyond what political conditions would
otherwise allow." Id.
109. For example, during the early nationalist periods in West Africa and
Central America corruption may have allowed the groups to "assimilate each
other." Id. In Central America, "corruption has been a major factor in the
succession mechanism by integrating the leaders of new coup into the existing
upper class." Id.
110. Nye draws heavily from the functionalist approach which argues that
.a degree of low-level corruption can 'soften relations of officials and people' by
humaniz[ing government and mak[ing] it less awesome. Id. (citing M.
McMullan, A Theory of Corruption, 9 Soc. REV. 181, 196 (1961)).
111. See infra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the Institutionalist approach to
corruption set forth by Huntington.
112. Nye, supra note 79, at 421-23.
113. Id. at 424 tbl. 1. In his matrix, Nye divided development problems into
three categories: (1) economic development measured in three subsets: capital,
bureaucracy and skills; (2) national integration divided into two subsets: elite and
non-elite; and (3) governmental capacity, divided into two subsets: effectiveness
and legitimacy. Id. at 419-21.
114. Id. at 427 (emphasis added). Although Nye also admits that "[alt this
point, however, not enough information is at hand to justify great confidence in
the exact conclusions reached here." Id.
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socialism and "association of profit with imperialism," which has
"led to a systematic bias against the market mechanism." 1 5 Nye
writes that corruption can be positive if it is used to counteract
such systematic bias. 116 In other words, corruption is acceptable
if it promotes the cause of capitalism.
3. Institutional Revisionists
Sharing with the other revisionists a distaste for the moralist
a priori condemnation of corruption, the institutionalists
attributed corruption to the absence of effective political
institutionalization." 7  Huntington argued that modernization
and development create new sources of wealth and power that
are outside the traditional norms of a developing society and that
are regulated by more modern norms not yet accepted by that
society's majority." 8 Modernization entails increased corruption
because modernization or development "involves the expansion of
the output side of the political system, and the multiplication of
governmental activities multiplies the opportunities for
corruption."1 19 The institutionalists argued that corruption can
play a useful role when it contributes to political development by
"prevent[ing] the alienation of certain groups from society and the
political system,... particularly if it contributes to the building of
new and stronger institutions."120  Echoing the functional-
integrationists, the institutionalist approach maintained that
"[1]ike machine politics or clientalistic politics in general,
corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to
groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from
society." 12 1
The institutionalists believed that corruption in certain
developing countries may be positive because it is an acceptable
alternative to violence in times of change when it facilitates elite
integration and humanizes government for non-elites; that is, one
who corrupts a system is more likely to identify with it than one
who attacks a system. 12 2 In addition, according to Huntington,
institutionalization will ultimately reduce opportunities for
115. Id. at 420.
116. Id.
117. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER, supra note 78, at 59. Huntington
defines "institutionalization" as: "the process by which organizations and
procedures acquire value and stability." Id. at 12.
118. Id. at 61.
119. Ben-Dor, supra note 82, at 74 (summarizing Huntington's arguments).
120. Id. at 75.
121. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER, supra note 78, at 64.
122. Id.
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corruption by strengthening political parties, i.e., corruption will
indirectly undermine itself. 1 23
4. The Revisionist Approach and the Principle of Geographical
Morality
In the words of one commentator, the revisionist view
amounted to the following:
[P]oor countries for cultural and historical reasons have a
propensity toward corruption, seen as a violation of Western norms.
To this propensity may be added a breakdown in the allocative
mechanisms of society, or economic, political, and administrative
reasons, so that corruption steps in to fulfill the missing functions.
Corruption is thus legitimized in terms of its prevalence, and of its
functionality: indeed, given the inappropriateness of Western
norms and inadequacy of Western institutions, corruption does not
really exist at all-it is simply a different way of doing business. 124
The removal of the moral aspect of corruption meant that
Westerners could act corruptly without any moral misgivings.
The revisionist discourse on political corruption provided the
intellectual and moral justification for multinational
corporations-the new colonial masters-to apply a different,
lower standard of conduct to their actions in the South than they
would apply to their actions in the North. This analysis is
supported by the comment of Singapore's Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Labour in 1968 on the revisionist discourse on
corruption in Asia:
I think it is monstrous for these well-intentioned and largely
misguided scholars to suggest corruption as a practical and
efficient instrument for rapid development in Asia and Africa. Once
upon a time, Westerners tried to subjugate Asia . . . by selling
opium. The current defense of Kleptocracy is a new kind of opium by
some Western intellectuals, devised to perpetuate Asian
backwardness and degradation. I think the only people ... pleased
with the contribution of these scholars are the Asian
Kleptocrats. 1
25
In other words, the revisionist discourse on corruption ironically
perpetuated the rule of geographical morality, while denying the
relevance of morality.
123. Id. at 69.
124. Caden & Caiden, supra note 76, at 304.
125. KLITGAARD, supra note 6, at 29 (emphasis added) (citing the statements
of Minister S. Rajaratnam in 1968).
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III. THE POST-COLD WAR CRUSADE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION AND THE RULE OF GEOGRAPHICAL MORALITY
A. Globalization and the End of the Cold War
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent process of
globalization gave rise to the current anti-corruption
movement 126 and the rejection of the revisionist hypothesis that
corruption is necessary and sometimes good for development. 127
The defeat of Communism contributed to the rejection of the
revisionist discourse on corruption because it was no longer
necessary to defend corruption as a weapon to combat socialism
and its "systematic bias" against "the market mechanism." 128
The anti-corruption movement gained strength when Europe felt
the effects of the explosion of corruption closer to home in the
transitional economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
126. Terry Atlas, Trading Places: Business Now Top U.S. Global Priority, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 20, 1994, at 1, available at 1994 WL 6523346 (citing Secretary of State
Warren Christopher's cable to U.S. embassies acknowledging the greater
importance placed on competitiveness and overseas exports rather than on the
political and military concerns that had dominated U.S. priorities during the Cold
War). See also Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance:
Corruption, Corporate Responsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global
Economy, 22 N.C. J. INTL. & COM. REG. 389, 399 (1997) (citing the shift to Western-
style democracy and market economies as a cause of the increased priority placed
on international economic policy). In addition, the authors note President Bill
Clinton's statement that national security now encompasses "economic security."
Id. at 399-400.
127. E.g., STRATEGY & POLICY OFFICE, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ANTI-
CORRUPTION POLICY (1998); Ben-Dor, supra note 82, at 81. Specifically, the
functionalist framework was discredited on the basis of the irrelevance of the
American urban political machine to the realities of most developing countries and
on the fact that cases of corruption rarely involve people of underprivileged
groups. Id. at 72-74. The economic-market framework was attacked on many
grounds, including: (1) corruption does not correlate with high periods of
economic growth, in fact, just the opposite is true; (2) corruption does not wither
away once the process of growth is underway; (3) money from corruption does not
go into investment, but rather into Swiss Bank accounts and leaves the
developing country where it is needed the most; and (4) corruption has negative
effects on entrepreneurs who neither have connections nor pay bribes. Id. at 70-
71. The institutionalist framework was criticized for holding that corruption
withers away with institutionalization and for ignoring the dangers of over-
institutionalization, which itself can contribute to corruption. Id. at 76-80. See
generally id. for a more detailed criticism of each of the three revisionist schools.
128. Nye, supra note 79, at 420. See also supra text accompanying note
115.
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Union. 129 Globalization also increased the opportunities for, and
incidence of, corruption i3 as more and more businesses "went
international."13 ' This trend led both multinational corporations
and peoples from the South to join the anti-corruption movement
for the first time.
B. The Current Anti-Corruption Discourse
The current anti-corruption discourse has had three
distinctive characteristics. The first characteristic is its rejection
of "geographical morality," including a rejection and minimization
of the importance of cultural differences as to what constitutes
"corrupt practices," such as bribery. The second characteristic is
its reliance on economic arguments: corruption has been opposed
primarily on economic, not moral, grounds. The final
characteristic, related to the second, is a heavy reliance on social
science methodology and empirical data to prove the detrimental
economic consequences of corruption in the South. The first of
these characteristics is a reaction against the revisionist
discourse on political corruption. The second and third are
inherited from the revisionist approach in that they attempted to
surgically remove any discussion of morality from the analysis of
corruption in the South and relied instead on economic and
empirical data. This modern, amoral, economically-based
approach to corruption, however, categorically rejects the
revisionist approach to corruption.
1. Rejection of Geographical Morality and Cultural Relativism
The discourse of the current anti-corruption movement
dismisses the premise that what constitutes a "corrupt act" depends
on the society and the culture in question. For example, Robert
Klitgaard writes, "[T]he majority of people in nearly all cultures
understand that most of the kinds of corruption . . .- bribery,
extortion, tax arreglos, police corruption, and so forth-are neither
lawful nor customary."13 2 Daniel Kaufmann writes similarly, "Even
in traditional settings, the cultural norms of gift-giving are
129. This was particularly true in the aftermath of East and West
Germany's unification when Germans felt the effects of political and business
corruption in their own country.
130. MOODY-STUART, supra note 6, at 7 (citing the tremendous increase in
grand corruption during the last decade).
131. Nichols, supra note 9, at 272-74 (noting that those working in
international commerce with years of experience have observed the large-scale
prevalence of transnational bribery only as a recent occurrence).
132. KLITGAARD, supra note 6, at 64. See also NOONAN, supra note 21, at
702-03 (noting that bribery is universally shameful in every country of the world).
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distinguishable from what would be regarded as abusive corrupt
practices anywhere."' 3 3  Furthermore, the current movement
maintains that the "cultural pluralism" argument has been abused
to justify immoral conduct by the North. Klitgaard writes that
although traditional practices such as gift-giving in certain societies
raise cultural issues, many academics and social scientists abuse
the notion of "cultural differences" as an explanation for
corruption.' 3 4 Others argue that cultural differences are being used
to justify respecting only the practices of "the most corrupt level of a
society."13 s In addition, scholars from the South, like Phongpaichit,
Piriyarangsan, and Ayittey, have written that it is an insult to
suppose that a traditional culture of gift-giving supports large
payoffs to political leaders.' 3 6
The rejection of geographical morality is also passionately
supported by Transparency International (TI), a non-
governmental organization formed in 1993.13 7 TI, with offices
worldwide, is a symbol of and major force behind the current
international anti-corruption campaign and has contributed
significantly to the evolution of the current anti-corruption
discourse. 13 8 TI's stated goals are to increase awareness of the
problem of corruption and to promote a multilateral solution to
the problem.13 9
133. Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: The Facts, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1997,
at 114, 116.
134. KLITGAARD, supra note 6, at 64. See also Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Corruption and the Global Economy, in CORRUPTION & INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT
INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18, 23 (U.N. Development Programme ed.,
1998).
135. Hudson P. Rogers et al., Ethics and Transnational Corporations in
Developing Countries: A Social Contract Perspective, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL MARKETING 11, 20 (Nejdet Delener ed., 1995).
136. E.g., GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY, AFRICA BETRAYED (1992); PASUK
PHONGPAICHIT & SUNGSIDH PIRIYARANGSAN, CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY IN THAILAND
(1994) (examining survey evidence that people in Thailand make quite
sophisticated distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate gifts; they do
not look with tolerance on major payoffs involving high level officials and major
investors). See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 134, at 23.
137. Transparency International, Facts and Figures on Corruption: 11
Questions Most Frequently Asked by Journalists, at http://www.transparency.de
/contact/media faq.html (last modified Feb. 9, 2000) (stating that "[tIhere is no
culture, anywhere and at any time in history, that anyone has been able to point
to, where it has been accepted by society as a whole that their leaders are entitled
as of right to make decisions in their own favour and against the group interest").
138. See generally NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMBATING CORRUPTION
(Transparency Int'l & Econ. Dev. Inst. of the World Bank eds., 1998).
139. TI has helped to build national chapters in countries worldwide in
order to foster anti-corruption programs that follow TI's approaches and core
values, which are outlined in its Standards of Conduct manual. TI has worked
closely with the World Bank and a number of small countries to help them
diagnose corruption problems, build consensus reforms, and introduce specific
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2. Emphasis on the Economic Costs of Corruption
The current anti-corruption campaign has ignored the moral
aspect of corruption completely and has emphasized instead its
economic consequences. 140 The emphasis on the economic
consequences is based on both practical and ideological
reasons. 14 1 An anti-corruption discourse based on morality is
likely to raise charges of moral imperialism, as the U.S.
experience with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977
has demonstrated. 14 2 Furthermore, as Klitgaard has written,
anti-corruption measures. TI has also conducted training for economic journalists
and parliamentarians in "national integrity workshops." Miguel Schloss,
Combating Corruption for Development: The Role of Government, Business, and Civil
Society, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMBATING CORRUPTION, supra note 138, at 1, 9-
11.
140. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J.
ECON. 599 (1993) (examining why corruption is costly to development);
Bribonomics, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 86 (noting that ethics and economics
may be working together for once); Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption
in Development, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMBATING CORRUPTION, supra note 138,
at 21, 23-24 (discussing the economic costs of corruption and refuting any
positive effects).
141. E.g., Beverley Earle, The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the
Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 207, 224 (1996) (noting that moral and
ethical arguments have not persuaded other countries to adopt legislation similar
to the FCPA).
142. For more than twenty years, the United States has attempted to get its
European and Japanese allies to adopt laws like the FCPA as amended, which
prohibits bribery of foreign public officials by U.S. persons. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, dd-
2, ff (1997). Stephen Muffler, Proposing a Treaty on the Prevention of International
Corrupt Payments: Cloning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is Not the Answer, 1
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 3, 13-14 (1995) (noting that Japan, Germany, and France,
led by Great Britain, had blocked attempts by the United States in the past to
secure a multinational agreement against transnational bribery since many
English economists saw bribe offerings as "good business"). Throughout this time,
the FCPA has been described as an overreaching and naive attempt by the U.S.
government to impose unrealistic moral standards on global business conduct.
Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony,
20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419, 422 (1999) (arguing that in addition to cultural
imperialism, a "political peril" arises from the FCPA that adds the risk of cross-
national hostility to such an officious and "overreaching legislation across national
borders"). Others labeled the United States attempt to convince other countries to
adopt legislation similar to the FCPA as "American Imperialism" and doomed as a
result. Muffler, supra, at 15. Many scholars have even argued that the United
States should abandon the FCPA because of the threat of "moral imperialism" that
is imposed by such a law's extraterritorial reach. David A. Gantz, Globalizing
Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a New International Legal
Consensus, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 457, 468 (1998) (arguing that it is more
advisable to work with foreign nations "to adopt and vigorously enforce laws that
criminalize bribery within their own borders," while avoiding multilateral
agreements).
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Western intellectuals are uncomfortable with moral issues. 143 As
a result, the anti-corruption literature written over the last few
years has concentrated on the economic costs of corruption.
Beverley Earle explains this shift in discourse on corruption to
discourse concentrating on economics and the influence of TI as
follows:
Fighters of corruption, such as former President Jimmy
Carter, 1 4 4 were often ridiculed as "do gooders" who ignored the
realities of business. Conventional wisdom dictated that
attempting to change business practices was the equivalent of Don
Quixote tilting at windmills. However, a new development may
alter the business landscape. Transparency International (TI),
modeled on Amnesty International, is dedicated to ending the
inefficient and costly system of bribery of foreign officials. This
grass roots movement by a non-governmental organization (NGO)
represents an important philosophical shift on this issue. This
thrust is coming from those countries where bribery has been
endemic and citizens can appreciate the costs to their society.
These costs can be seen in poorly planned projects that serve to
hide payoffs and in the large foreign bank accounts of public
officials. This shift from a moral to an economic argument is a
significant change that may presage a better result in the effort to
eliminate corruption.
1 4 5
The proliferation of multilateral initiatives against corruption and
bribery discussed in Part IV of this Article indicates that, at least
so far, Earle's prediction that the shift to an economic argument
against corruption would be good for the anti-corruption
campaign has in fact been accurate. 14 6
It must be noted, however, that even more recently, the anti-
corruption movement has come to the recognition that the moral
aspect of corruption must be addressed and that any anti-
corruption campaign cannot succeed until it addresses the
internal, or moral and ethical, causes of corruption as well as the
143. Klitgaard writes that:
The moral angle of corruption, the intertwining of ethical judgments with
policy choices, makes scholars shy away. In Western academic culture it
is taboo to be seen as passing ethical judgments on the poor or on poor
nations, as "imposing Western values," or as attributing underdevelopment
to the behavior and policies of the underdeveloped countries. And besides,
isn't corruption, like sin, something we all decry but about which both
social science and public policy are impotent?
KLITGAARD, supra note 6, at 190.
144. Jimmy Carter supported the passage of the FCPA and signed it into law
in 1977. See infra note 154.
145. Earle, supra note 141, at 209.
146. Earle also points out another feature of the current anti-corruption
campaign: it includes within its ranks not only interests from the North but also
from the South. Id. The merit of this observation will be considered later in this
article. See infra Parts IV.B, V.
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external, or economic and political, causes of corruption. In
recognition of the moral aspect of corruption, multilateral and
international institutions, such as the OECD, the OAS, and the
World Bank; aid agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID); and non-governmental
organizations such as TI have urged the development of codes of
ethics for government officials. In addition, such organizations
are conducting "ethics" and "integrity" workshops as part of their
anti-corruption programs.147
3. Reliance on Empirical Data
Any survey of the recent legal and non-legal literature on
corruption will demonstrate that the vast majority of it relies on
"empirical data" to prove its goal. Economists rely on empirical
evidence to show that corruption "slows economic growth and
serves as a heavy tax on investment."148 Political scientists and
development specialists rely on empirical evidence to prove that
corruption undermines political development and impedes the
development of democracy and its institutions, as well as the
promotion of the rule of law.14 9 Finally, even lawyers and legal
scholars rely on empirical evidence to prove that international
conventions that criminalize transnational corruption and bribery
147. E.g., WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF
THE WORLD BANK 29 (1997) (explaining the Bank's role in combating corruption in
the projects that it finances); INT'L MONETARY FUND, GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE IMFS
ROLE 4 (1997) (acknowledging that "it is difficult to separate economic aspects of
governance from political aspects"); Schloss, supra note 139, at 9 (outlining the
work of Transparency International and its use of integrity workshops).
148. Michael Johnston, Cross-Border Corruption: Points of Vulnerability and
Challenges for Reform, in CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 134, at 7. See also Paolo Mauro, The Effects of
Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country
Analysis, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 83-85 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed.,
1997) (noting that a renewed interest in corruption has led researchers to attempt
to quantify corruption using modem methods of analysis and models, which had
been severely limited in the past); Kevin M. Murphy et al., Why is Rent-Seeking So
Costly to Growth? 83 AMER. ECON. REV. 413 (1993); Susan Rose-Ackerman, The
Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra, at
45-46; SHANG JIN-WEI, How TAXING IS CORRUPTION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS? 22-
23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6030, 1997) (noting that
corruption discourages foreign direct investment and imposes a 20% "tax" on
firms investing in countries with high corruption).
149. E.g., Nichols, supra note 9, at 277 (warning that pervasive corruption
drives out honest and effective public servants, "leaving only the dishonest and
ineffective"); Agnieszka Klich, Note, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121, 130 (1996) (noting that democracy
and human rights are undermined, thus lowering the performance of
governments, when individuals and corporations influence public officials for
pecuniary gain).
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are "viable and desirable."1 5 0 Interestingly, even the rejection of
the "revisionist hypothesis" is based on new empirical research;
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) quotes an empirical study to
rebut the hypothesis:
Graft and corruption has strongly affected development efforts
negatively, belying the so-called "revisionist hypothesis" prevalent
in the West which considers corruption as either a necessary step
in the development process or a means of speeding it up. Instead
[our research] found that corruption leads to favoring of inefficient
producers, the unfair and inequitable distribution of scarce public
resources, and the leakage of revenue from government coffers to
private hands. Less directly, but no less perniciously, corruption
leads to loss of confidence in government. 15 1
The next part of this Article will look at some of the tangible
results of this post-Cold War, amoral, economically- and
empirically-driven, anti-corruption discourse in the form of new
multilateral agreements against corruption.
IV. INTERNATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES
AGAINST CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY: OVERCOMING
THE RULE OF GEOGRAPHICAL MORALITY?
A. International and Multilateral Anti-Corruption Initiatives
During the last three decades of the twentieth century,
concern about the prevalence of corruption in international
business resulted in the drafting and adoption of various legal
initiatives to combat corruption and bribery.I5 2  More
importantly, these initiatives were aimed partly at discrediting the
rule of geographical morality by prohibiting payment of bribes to
foreign public officials. This prohibition of "active bribery" 153 was
directed at multinational corporations from the North in their
business dealings with the South. The anti-corruption initiatives
150. Nichols, supra note 9, at 259.
151. ASIAN DEV. BANK, ANTI-cORRUPTION POLICY 8 (1998) (citing LEDVINA V.
CARINO & JOSIE H. DE LEON, FINAL REPORT FOR THE STUDY OF GRAFT AND CORRUPTION,
RED TAPE AND INEFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT (1983)).
152. Throughout the 1980s, the United States continued its crusade to
persuade other industrialized countries to adopt legislation similar to the FCPA,
but those attempts failed. See supra note 142. Similarly, the United Nations'
negotiations on a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations (TNCs)
continued until 1986, but these negotiations also resulted in no agreement.
153. Under some legal systems, the terms "active bribery" or "active
corruption" are used to describe the act of giving a bribe and the term "passive
bribery" is used to describe the action of the person, usually a public official, who
receives or accepts a bribe. See infra note 238.
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of the 1970s were largely unsuccessful and did not result in an
international agreement against bribery. Throughout the 1980s,
the United States was the only country to prohibit active bribery
of foreign public officials, which was banned by the FCPA enacted
under the Carter Administration.1 5 4  The anti-corruption
initiatives of the 1990s, however, have been the most successful
because two multilateral conventions against corruption have
been signed: the OAS Anti-Corruption Convention and the OECD
Convention Against Bribery in International Business. To date
these Conventions are the most forceful denunciations of the rule
of geographical morality; but like their precursors, they have not
been unqualified successes. To the extent that the modern anti-
corruption initiatives have failed, their failures can be traced to
the colonial period and the legacy of geographical morality.
1. The United Nations
(a) Draft International Agreement On Illicit Payments
On December 15, 1975, the Generally Assembly of the
United Nations passed Resolution 3514, entitled "Measures
Against Corrupt Practices of Transnational and Other
Corporations, Their Intermediaries and Others Involved." l Ss
Resolution 3514 condemned "all corrupt practices, including
bribery, by transnational and other corporations, their
154. In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal and disclosures by more
than four hundred large U.S. corporations in the form of illegal political
contributions or payments to foreign officials bordering on bribery, the U.S.
Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, dd-
1, dd-2, dd-3, ff (1997). The FCPA contains two substantive areas: anti-bribery
provisions and accounting and record-keeping provisions. The accounting and
record-keeping provisions were intended to prohibit the establishment of
corporate slush funds to finance illegal payments. These provisions enforce the
anti-bribery provisions by requiring that all amounts be recorded accurately on
the company's books. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b). The anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA, which are relevant to this article, criminalize the "corrupt" offer, payment
or promise to pay money, gifts or "anything of value" by any "domestic concern" to
any foreign official, foreign political party, candidate for political office or
intermediary in order to obtain, retain or direct business. 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-2(a),
(h)(1).
155. G.A. Res. 3514, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 69, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1976). The General Assembly adopted Resolution 3514 by consensus.
UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, AD Hoc INTERGOVERNMENTAL
WORKING GROUP ON CORRUPT PRACTICES, CORRUPT PRACTICES, PARTICULARLY ILLICIT
PAYMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES
RELATED TO THE FORMULATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT para. 1, at 4, U.N.
Doc. E/AC.64/3 (1977) [hereinafter UNESCO, AD Hoc INTERGOVERNMENTAL
WORKING GROUP].
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intermediaries and others involved, in violation of the laws and
regulations of host countries."1 56 The resolution reaffirmed the
rights of countries to enforce the countries' laws prohibiting
corrupt practices against such corporations.' 5 7 The General
Assembly also called upon both home and host countries to
adopt legislation that would prevent such corrupt practices where
they occurred.' 5 8 In addition, the Resolution directed the U.N.
Commission on Transnational Corporations to make further
recommendations for eliminating corrupt practices, including
bribery.' 9 The U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations
responded by forming the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working
Group on Corrupt Practices (Working Group) which met regularly
between 1976 and 1980160 and submitted reports of its
discussions. 16 1  The Working Group concluded that to
156. UNESCO, AD Hoc INTERGOVERNMENTAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 155,
para. 1, at 4.
157. Id.
158. See Transnational Corporations: Measures Against Corrupt Practices of
Transnational and Other Corporations, Their Intermediaries and Others Involved,
U.N. Economic and Social Council, 61st Sess., Agenda Item 13, addendum, U.N.
Doc. E/5838/Add. 1 (1976) (containing a survey of aspects of national legislation
on corrupt practices and an analysis of governments' views and proposals to
further deal with the problems of corrupt practices).
159. Id.
160. At its sixty-first session, the Economic and Social Council adopted
Resolution 2041 of Aug. 5, 1976 in which it decided "to establish an Ad Hoc
Intergovernmental Working Group on corrupt practices to conduct an examination
of the problem of corrupt practices, in particular bribery .... ." 1976 U.N.Y.B.
459, 460, U.N. Sales No. E.78.I.1. The Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group
held its first session during November 15-19, 1976. Id. at 461.
161. UNESCO, AD Hoc INTERGOVERNMENTAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 155.
The following conclusions of the Working Group are particularly noteworthy: First,
the Working Group accepted a diversity of approaches to defining "corrupt
practices" and stated that "[tihe scope of those practices that are considered to be
corrupt varies from one country to another and from one society to another." Id.
para. 17, at 7. As a result, the Working Group limited the scope of any
international agreement to "bribes" and "illicit payments" instead of corrupt
practices. Id. paras. 18-20, at 7. Specifically, the Working Group excluded from
the scope of any international agreement a broader category of improper activities,
including "unfair competition" and "restrictive business practices such as . . .
price discrimination." Id. para. 18, at 7. Second, the Working Group
distinguished between "illicit payments" and "bribes." Id. paras. 21, 23 at 7, 8.
Illicit payments were defined as a broader category of payments (financial or non-
financial) "made with the intention to improperly influence a decision." Id. para.
21, at 7. The word "bribery," on the other hand, was the term "used in most penal
legislations to describe the payment of anything of value made to a decision maker
(or his agent) in order to influence his official decision-making." Id. para. 23, at 8.
Third, the Working Group distinguished among three types of illicit payments: (1)
expediting payments, (2) payments to alter decision-making, and (3) payments to
maintain a favorable climate. Id. para. 27, at 9. The Working Group concluded
that payments to alter decision-making were a more serious problem than
expediting payments because such payments affect the "use and distribution of
2000]
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successfully combat corruption and bribery in international
commercial transactions, "international action" was necessary.
16 2
On the basis of this conclusion, the Working Group began work
on the proposed text of an international agreement, which it
completed in 1980. On the basis of the Working Group's
proposal, the U.N. Committee on an International Agreement on
Illicit Payments drafted an International Agreement on Illicit
Payments163 (Draft Convention). The Draft Convention sought to
resources," which in developing countries can be seen as "external interference
with internal decision making processes.' Id. para. 32, at 9-10. Expediting
payments were defined as those that speed up the decision-making process; they
are most common when a civil service is underpaid and understaffed. Id. para.
28, at 9. Such payments were considered less serious by the Working Group. It
noted, however, that expediting payments were "by no means harmless,' if such
payments were made by multinational corporations with deep pockets and the
willingness to pay more than local competitors could offer. Id. para. 30, at 9. The
Working Group concluded that expediting payments can be detrimental because
"[tihe ability to pay, to pay in more sophisticated ways, and to offer a better
prospect for concealing the payment could give the corporation an unfair
competitive advantage.' Id. With regard to illicit payments for maintaining a
favorable climate, the Working Group distinguished between political
contributions made "to maintain or to secure a government policy favourable to
the payer' and more complicated situations in which payment is made "with the
intent to alter the system" (for example, when obtaining the removal,
appointment, or election of particular officials, or changing the general orientation
of the decision-makers even though no payment is made for any specific decision).
Id. paras. 33, 34 at 10.
162. The Working Group Report stated that "[a]lthough national laws exist
in most countries with respect to corrupt practices, they are not always effective
against illicit payments in international commercial transactions because of the
transnational ("across-the-frontier) element in the offence and its international
implications.' Id. para. 47, at 13. Furthermore, an international approach is
necessary because national unilateral action may only have the effect of putting a
country's firms at a "serious competitive disadvantage internationally.' Id. para.
51, at 13.
163. Conclusions Reached by the Committee on an International Agreement
on Illicit Payments During Its First Session Held at Headquarters From 29 Jan. to
9 Feb. 1979, U.N. Economic and Social Council, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/AC.67/L.1
(1979). The Agreement was completed during the second negotiating session.
International Agreement on Illicit Payments: Draft Final Clauses Prepared by the
Secretariat, U.N. Economic and Social Council, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/AC.67/L.2
(1979). The following countries were represented in either or both of the
negotiating sessions: Argentina, Australia, Benin, Brazil, Belgium, Canada,
Central African Empire, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Ethiopia, France, Gabon, West Germany, Greece, Holy See, India, Iran, Italy, Ivory
Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria,
Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic
of Cameroon, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire and Zambia.
For a summary of the negotiation sessions, see UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON
ILLICIT PAYMENTS ON ITS FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS, U.N. Doc. E/ 1979/104 (1979)
[hereinafter UNESCO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE]. The Draft Convention was
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criminalize as "undue consideration" of public officials the
"offering, promising, or giving" of illicit payments 1 64 in connection
with international commercial transactions. In addition, the
convention sought to criminalize the "soliciting, demanding,
accepting or receiving, directly or indirectly, of any illicit
payments" as "undue consideration" 16 5 in connection with an
international commercial transaction.166 The Draft Convention
would have recognized that not all countries attribute criminal
culpability to legal persons, such as corporations, and therefore
would have imposed the requirement of "comparable deterrent
effects." 16 7 The Draft Convention also addressed mutual legal
broader in scope than the OECD Convention that was ratified more than two
decades later.
164. The term "public official" was defined under Article 2(a) of the Draft
Convention as:
any person, whether appointed or elected, whether permanently or
temporarily who, at the national, regional or local level holds a legislative,
administrative, judicial or military office, or who, performing a public
function, is an employee of a Government or of a public governmental
authority or agency or who otherwise performs a public function.
UNESCO, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE, supra note 163, at 4.
165. It should be noted that there was some disagreement about the use of
the word "undue," as many felt that it could be interpreted to allow certain illicit
payments if they were determined to be "due." Id. at 9.
166. Article 1 of the Draft Convention provided that:
Each Contracting State undertakes to make the following acts punishable
by appropriate criminal penalties under its national law:
(a) The offering, promising or giving of any payment, gift or other advantage
by any natural person, on his own behalf or on behalf of any enterprise or
any other person whether juridical or natural, to or for the benefit of a
public official as undue consideration for performing or refraining from the
performance of his duties in connexion [sic] with an international
commercial transaction.
(b) The soliciting, demanding, accepting or receiving, directly or indirectly,
by a public official of any payment, gift or other advantage, as undue
consideration for performing or refraining from the performance of his
duties in connexion [sic] with an international commercial transaction.
Id. at 4.
167. Article 1(2) provided:
Each Contracting State likewise undertakes to make the [prohibited acts]
punishable by appropriate criminal penalties under its national law when
committed by a juridical person, or, in the case of a State which does not
recognize criminal responsibility of juridical persons, to take appropriate
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assistance,168  record keeping and accounting,169  and
extradition. 170  The Draft Convention contained two further
provisions that remained controversial and were therefore
bracketed to indicate a lack of consensus: 171 Article 4, which
dealt with jurisdiction, x72 and Article 8, which dealt with
voidability of contracts procured through illicit payments. 173
Article 4 of the Draft Convention incorporated a broad definition
of jurisdiction that included recognition of nationality
jurisdiction. This was unacceptable to many countries that did
not recognize nationality jurisdiction. 174 Consensus, therefore,
existed only with regard to the traditional territoriality principle of
jurisdiction, i.e., that illicit payments must have some contact
with the territory of the nation asserting jurisdiction. Article 8 of
the Draft Convention would have allowed the courts of signatory
states to declare null and void any contract determined to be
obtained as a result of an illicit payment. 175  The Draft
Convention was adopted by the U.N. Economic and Social
Council and forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly
168. Article 10 of the Draft Convention addressed the issue of mutual legal
assistance with regards to both criminal investigations and proceedings. Id. at 7.
169. Article 6 of the Draft Convention, which briefly addressed the issue of
record keeping and accounting, required that countries must ensure that
enterprises within their jurisdiction maintain accurate books and records of
payments made in international transactions. Id. at 6.
170. Article 11 of the Draft Convention stated that the agreement should be
viewed as an extradition treaty. Id. at 8.
171. Id. at5, 6.
172. Id. at 5.
173. Id. at 6.
174. "[D]elegations noted that their national legal systems did not accept the
theory ofjurisdictioh based solely on nationality." Id. at 12. Under the nationality
theory of jurisdiction, countries assert jurisdiction solely based on the nationality
of the actors, irrespective of any territorial contact even if all acts take place
outside the territory of the country in question. The United States recognizes
nationality jurisdiction and asserts jurisdiction over actions of U.S. persons,
irrespective of where those acts take place. Many other nations do not recognize
nationality jurisdiction and assert jurisdiction only based on the territoriality
principle.
175. Notes to the Draft Convention provide:
Several delegations noted that article 8 would pose serious constitutional,
legislative or juridical problems for them, especially since the article would
affect the area of private law which was not otherwise within the scope of
the agreement. Several other delegations expressed the view that the
provisions contained in article 8 should pose no insurmountable problems,
that the article provided a strong additional deterrent against corrupt
practices, and that it should therefore be retained; those delegations were
also of the opinion that the article should form an essential part of the
agreement.
Id. at 13.
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for consideration in 1980.176 At that time India, on behalf of the
"Group of 77" developing countries, introduced a draft decision
entitled "Transnational Corporations."17 7  The draft decision
required the "United Nations Conference on an International
Agreement on Illicit Payments to be convened only after the
closure of the United Nations Conference on a Code of Conduct
on Transnational Corporations."178  This code of conduct,
however, was strongly opposed by the North. As a result, neither
the Draft Convention nor the Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations was adopted. 17 9
(b) United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in
International Business and the International Code of Conduct for
Public Officials
More than two decades after the passage of Resolution 3514
condemning "corrupt practices" and the submission of the Draft
Convention,' 8 0 the U.N. General Assembly adopted the United
Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial Transactions's ' (hereinafter the Declaration) in 1996.
176. The draft was approved by the Economic and Social Council and
forwarded to the General Assembly with the recommendation that a United
Nations Conference be convened to adopt such an agreement in the last quarter of
1981. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, CONFERENCE TO CONCLUDE A
CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND AN INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT ON ILLICIT PAYMENTS at 3, 13, U.N. Doc. E/1980/96 (1980) [hereinafter
UNESCO, CONFERENCE TO CONCLUDE A CODE OF CONDUCT]. The General Assembly
took no action on the recommendation because a number of developing countries
insisted that it be linked with the more general Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations that was opposed by some Western states. Id. at 3. See also Report of
the Second Committee (Part 1), U.N. Economic and Social Council, 35th Sess.,
Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. A/35/545 (1980) [hereinafter Report of the Second
Committee]; 1 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS LAW: THE U.N. & TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 48-49 (K.R. Simmonds ed., 1989).
177. UNESCO, CONFERENCE TO CONCLUDE A CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note
176, para. 14, at 3; Transnational Corporations, India: Draft Decision, U.N.
Economic and Social Council, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 1, U.N. Doc.
E/1980/C.1/L.22 (1980) [hereinafter Transnational Corporations, India: Draft
Decision].
178. Transnational Corporations, India: Draft Decision, supra note 172, at 1.
See also U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. DOC. E/1980/40 (1980)
(emphasis added).
179. Both documents were transmitted to the General Assembly for further
consideration during its thirty-fifth session. Nonetheless, the General Assembly
took no action on either document. Report of the Second Committee, supra note
176, para. 4(h), at 2.
180. See G.A. Res. 3514, supra note 155.
181. G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 51st Sess., 86th plen. mtg.,
pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/191 (1997). In addition, in 1997, the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations recommended to the General Assembly the
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The Declaration followed close on the heels of Resolution 51/59
(Action Against Corruption) which had annexed thereto the
International Code of Conduct for Public Officials (the Code of
Conduct). 8 2 Both documents are non-binding, but they are
reflections of the success of the current anti-corruption campaign
and the post-Cold War anti-corruption discourse.183
The Declaration addresses both passive and active bribery.
The Declaration calls on Member States to "take effective and
concrete action to combat all forms of corruption, bribery and
related illicit practices in international commercial
transactions."18 4 In particular, the Declaration calls for "effective
enforcement of existing laws prohibiting bribery."' 8s  The
Declaration urges Member States to criminalize bribery of foreign
public officials "in an effective and coordinated manner" 18 6 and
recommends many of the provisions found in the recently-
adopted OAS and OECD Conventions (discussed infra). For
example, it exhorts Member States to deny tax deductibility of
bribes;' 8 7 develop and maintain accounting standards and
transparency;18 8 develop and maintain business codes and
adoption of a draft resolution entitled International Cooperation Against Corruption
and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, E.S.C. Res. 1997/25, U.N.
ESCOR, 36th pIn. mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/1997.3 (1997); G.A. Res. 52/87, U.N.
GAOR, 52d Sess., 70th pIn. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/87 (1998). Most recently,
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has urged the Secretary-
General to ask the Secretariat of the United Nations to update the United Nations
manual on practice measures against corruption by incorporating recent
developments and the "impact of recent multilateral initiatives." Action Against
Corruption, E.S.C. Res. 1998/16, U.N. ESCOR, 44th plen. mtg., para. 1, U.N. Doc.
E/INF/1998/INF/3/add.2 (1998).
182. G.A. Res. 51/59, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 51st Sess., 82d plen. mtg.,
annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/59 (1997). In addition, the General Assembly
adopted Resolution 50/225 on Public Administration and Development which
primarily recognized the importance of effective public institutions to development
and "[r]ecogniz[edl that Governments in all countries should make their
procedures transparent in order to avoid and combat all acts of corruption. .. "
G.A. Res. 50/225, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., 112th, plen. mtg., pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/50/225 (1996).
183. This success can be seen in the proliferation of multilateral agreements
against corruption such as the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
adopted by the Organization of American States on March 29, 1996; Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions signed on December 17,
1997; the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the
European Communities; and the ongoing work of the Council of Europe on a
convention against corruption.
184. G.A. Res. 51/19 1, supra note 181, annex, para. 1.
185. Id.
186. Id. annex, para. 2.
187. Id. annex, para. 4.
188. Id. annex, para. 5.
LEGACY OF GEOGRAPHICAL MORALITY
standards,18 9 mutual legal assistance and cooperation; 190 and
prohibit and punish illicit enrichment by public officials. 191 At
the same time, the Declaration recognizes the jurisdictional
issues raised by the extraterritorial reach of anti-bribery laws
applicable to foreign public officials, as well as the discomfort
that such initiatives cause for countries sensitive to any
international effort impinging on their sovereign rights.192
To the extent that any Member State adopts it, the Code of
Conduct for Public Officials (Code of Conduct) prohibits certain
acts on the part of public officials; however, Member States are
not required to adopt the Code of Conduct. The U.N. resolution to
which it is annexed merely "recommends" the Code of Conduct to
the Member States "as a tool to guide their efforts against
corruption."' 93 The Code of Conduct adopts the principle that a
public office is a position of trust, which implies a duty to act in
the public interest, and that "the ultimate loyalty of public
officials should be to the public interests of their country as
expressed through the democratic institutions of government." 194
In addition, the Code of Conduct requires public officials to be
"attentive, fair and impartial" and not to provide "undue
preferential treatment to any group or individual or improperly
discriminate against any group or individual . ... "195
Furthermore, public officials may not use their official capacities
for improper advancement of their own family or their family's
personal or financial interests, nor may they improperly use
189. Id. annex, para. 6.
190. Id. annex, para. 8.
191. Id. annex, para. 7.
192. This tension is seen in the last two paragraphs of the Declaration:
Actions taken in furtherance of the present Declaration shall respect fully
the national sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction of Member States, as
well as the rights and obligations of Member States under existing treaties
and international law, and shall be consistent with human rights and
fundamental freedoms;
Member States agree that actions taken by them to establish jurisdiction
over acts of bribery of foreign public officials in international commercial
transactions shall be consistent with the principles of international law
regarding the extraterritorial application of a State's laws.
Id. annex, paras. 11-12.
193. G.A. Res. 51/59, supra note 182, para. 2.
194. G.A. Res. 51/59, supra note 182, annex, para. 1. The wording of this
paragraph of the Code of Conduct raises a whole host of issues: What is a public
official as defined under national laws? Who determines what is in the public
interest? What happens in countries where the government is not governed by
democratic principles?
195. Id. annex, para. 3.
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public monies, services or property. 19 6 The Code of Conduct
targets the taking of bribes, directing public officials not to "solicit
or receive directly or indirectly any gift or other favour that may
influence the exercise of their functions, the performance of their
duties, or their judgement [sic]." 1 9 7 The Code also recommends
that other acts be prohibited to the extent consistent with
domestic laws.19 8
It must be noted that the non-binding Declaration and the
Code of Conduct are not adequate substitutes for the Draft
Convention. The continuing lack of a binding international anti-
corruption convention at the level of the United Nations is a
reflection of the North-South divide on the topic. This division
itself is a continuing legacy of geographical morality and its
attendant world view.
2. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (OAS
Convention)
In 1996, the thirty-four members of the Organization of
American States approved the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption (OAS Convention), 199 which aimed at eliminating
bribery and corruption of government officials. Twenty-one of the
thirty-four OAS member states signed the Convention on March
29, 1996 in Caracas, Venezuela. 20 0 Later that year, the United
States signed the Convention.2 0 1 The OAS Convention was the
first international legal framework to come into effect that
criminalized transnational bribery, i.e., active bribery of foreign
public officials. 20 2 The OAS Convention is important, too, in that
196. Id. annex, paras. 4, 6.
197. Id. annex, para. 9.
198. The Code of Conduct encourages countries to adopt certain legislation
and policies on duties of public officials, such as recognizing and avoiding conflict
of interest situations, immediately declaring any "possible or perceived" conflict of
interest, id. annex, para. 5; avoiding taking "improper advantage" of a public office
after departure from that office, id. annex, para. 7; voluntary disclosure of
personal assets as well as those of spouses and dependents, id. annex, para. 8;
and refraining from political and other activity that would "impair public
confidence in the impartial performance" of a public official's functions, id. annex,
para. 11.
199. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter OAS, Inter-American
Convention].
200. Id.
201. Department of Legal Cooperation and Information, Organization of
American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-58.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2000)
(displaying dates on which all countries signed the treaty).
202. As mentioned previously, until this time only the United States, under
the FCPA, prohibited bribery of foreign public officials. See supra note 142.
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it is the only anti-corruption convention adopted to date that is a
North-South instrument and that covers both passive and active
bribery.
The OAS Convention is a reflection of the current anti-
corruption discourse that emphasizes the correlation between the
rule of law, the promotion of democracy, and the suppression of
corruption. 20 3 As a general rule, the convention directs signatory
states to develop and strengthen legal mechanisms to "prevent,
detect, punish and eradicate" official corruption. 20 4 In fact, the
OAS Convention is "not grounded principally on trade or
economic development concerns, but on morality and the need to
preserve and protect democratic institutions."20 5 Interestingly,
this means that the OAS Convention explicitly recognizes the
moral dimension of corruption. This is a departure from the
current trend which emphasizes the economic dimension of the
issue. The OAS Convention prohibits the following "Acts of
Corruption": the solicitation or acceptance of any article of
monetary value or other benefit, such as a gift, by a government
official; the offering or granting of any such article or benefit; any
act or omission by a government official in the discharge of his
official duties for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for
himself or for a third party; the fraudulent use or concealment of
property derived from any of the Acts of Corruption; and
participating in or conspiring to commit any of the Acts of
Corruption.2 0 6 The OAS Convention also allows countries to
recognize their own additional Acts of Corruption if these are
agreed to among two or more signatory states.20 7 The OAS
Convention requires states to adopt "the necessary legislative or
other measures to establish as criminal offenses" the solicitation
or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of bribes by government
officials. 20 8 Countries are required to enact the necessary laws to
facilitate cooperation among themselves under the OAS
203. The preamble to the OAS Convention states: "CONSIDERING that
representative democracy, an essential condition for stability, peace and
development of the region, requires, by its nature, the combating of every form of
corruption in the performance of public functions, as well as acts of corruption
specifically related to such performance." OAS, Inter-American Convention, supra
note 199, pmbl., at 727.
204. Id.
205. Gantz, supra note 142, at 477.
206. OAS, Inter-American Convention, supra note 199, art. VI(1)(a)-(e), at
729.
207. Id. art. VI (2), at 729.
208. Id. art. VII, at 730. Although the Convention does not use the word
"bribe" we will use it in this article for sake of brevity to apply to "any article of
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for
himself or for another person or entity. .. ." Id. art. VI(1)(a), at 729.
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Convention209 and to establish jurisdiction over the offenses it
lists. Specifically, the OAS Convention requires countries to
recognize both territoriality 210 and nationality21' as bases for
jurisdiction over these offenses.212 Signatory states also are
required to consider the offenses listed under the OAS
Convention to be "extraditable offenses"213 and to consider the
OAS Convention an "extradition treaty."214
Under the OAS Convention, a signatory state is required to
prohibit "Transnational Bribery"215 and "Illicit Enrichment"216
"[slubject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its
legal system."217  Should a state decide to establish both
transnational bribery and illicit enrichment as offenses under its
domestic laws, then these offenses would be deemed "Acts of
Corruption" under the OAS Convention.218 If, however, a state
declines to adopt either or both provisions because of
constitutional or other legal constraints, then the OAS
Convention requires the state to provide assistance and
209. Id. art. VII, at 730.
210. Article V(1) states that: "Each State Party shall adopt such measures
as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has
established in accordance with this Convention when the offense in question is
committed in its territory." Id. art V(1), at 729.
211. Article V(2) states that: "Each State Party may adopt such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established
in accordance with this Convention when the offense is committed by one of its
nationals or by a person who habitually resides in its territory." Id. art. V(2), at
729.
212. The OAS Convention requires countries to establish jurisdiction over
an offense when the offense in question is (a) committed in its territory; (b)
committed by one of its nationals or by a person who habitually resides in its
territory; (c) over an alleged criminal when that person is not extradited on the
ground of nationality. Id. art. V(1)-(3), at 729. The OAS Convention also allows
any other jurisdictional basis recognized under domestic law. Id. art. V(4), at 729.
213. Id. art. XIII(2), at 731.
214. Extradition, however, is subject to the laws of the Requested State or
by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the Requested
State may refuse extradition. Id. art. XIII(3)-(6), at 731.
215. Article VIII requires each State, "[s]ubject to its Constitution and the
fundamental principles of its legal system" to prohibit and punish the "offering or
granting, directly or indirectly, by its nationals, persons having their habitual
residence in its territory and business domiciled there" of any article of monetary
value, or other benefit, gift, favor, etc. to a foreign government official. Id. art. VIII,
at 730.
216. The OAS Convention recognizes the principle of "Illicit Enrichment"
and requires a state to "take the necessary measures to establish under its laws
as an offense a significant increase in the assets of a government official that [he]
cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the
performance of his functions." Id. art. IX, at 730.
217. Id. arts. VIII, IX, at 730.
218. Id. art. VI, at 729.
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cooperation to other signatory states in their prosecution of the
offense insofar as its laws permit.2 19
In addition, the OAS Convention contains provisions that are
not mandatory but merely are recommended to signatory states;
some commentators have termed these "aspirational."2 20
Examples include Article XI (Progressive Development), which
recommends that states "consider" establishing additional
offenses as "Acts of Corruption" under the Convention by
establishing them as offenses under their domestic laws,2 2 1 and
Article III (Preventive Measures), which requires States to
"consider the applicability of measures" to strengthen their own
domestic institutions.2 2 2
The OAS Convention, like the OECD Convention, infra, is not
self-executing; it is subject to ratification and implementation.
Unlike the OECD Convention, the OAS Convention has not been
ratified to date by the United States, nor has it been implemented
by any of the states that have ratified it. One of the problems
with implementing the OAS Convention is that its scope is so
broad that it may necessitate changes in many different areas of
the law. Another drawback of the OAS Convention is that, unlike
the OECD Convention, it contains no deadline for
implementation.
In sum, the OAS Convention is much more ambitious than
the OECD Convention, and its scope is much broader because it
covers both active and passive bribery. In addition, it has many
more "aspirational" provisions than the OECD Convention and
there is less reliance on the domestic laws of the signatory states;
rather, the focus is on reforming the laws of the signatory states.
This is, of course, partly because the signatories of the OECD
Convention are mostly developed industrialized states, while the
OAS Convention includes many more developing nations that, as
219. Id. arts. XIV-XVI, at 732.
220. Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption:
A Comparison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INT'I L.
243, 247 (1998). See generally Conference, The Experts Roundtable: A Hemispheric
Approach to Combating Corruption, 15 AM. U. INTL L. REv. 759 (2000).
221. OAS, Inter-American Convention, supra note 199, art. XI(1), at 730.
These additional Acts of Corruption cover the same types of actions by
government officials that are addressed in the U.N. Code of Conduct for Public
Officials. G.A. Res. 51/59, supra note 182. In addition, the OAS Convention
recommends establishing as an Act of Corruption "[a]ny act or omission by any
person who . . . seeks to obtain a decision from a public authority whereby he
illicitly obtains for himself or for another person any benefit or gain, whether or
not such act or omission harms State property." OAS, Inter-American
Convention, supra note 199, art. XI(1)(c), at 731.
222. OAS, Inter-American Convention, supra note 199, art. III, pmbl., at
2000]
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we have discussed in this Article, suffer from the "stigma" of
corruption.
3. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions
The OECD's involvement in the anti-corruption campaign
dates back to 1976, when its members adopted the Declaration
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 223 and
the OECD Guidelines against bribery annexed to the
Declaration. 224 The OECD Guidelines stated that enterprises
should "not render-and they should not be solicited or expected
to render-any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect,
to any public servant or holder of public office."225 For the two
decades that followed, OECD members could not reach
consensus on a convention criminalizing bribery of foreign
government officials.
In 1994, the OECD adopted a Recommendation on Bribery in
International Business Transactions (the Recommendation).226
The Recommendation called upon member countries to take
"effective measures to deter, prevent and combat bribery of
foreign public officials in connection with international business
transactions" and instructed the OECD Committee on
International and Multilateral Enterprises (CIME) and its Working
Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (the
Working Group) to monitor the implementation of the
Recommendation. 227 Pursuant to its mandate, CIME proposed,
and the OECD adopted, a Revised Recommendation on May 23,
223. Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises,
June 21, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 967.
224. Id. 'Observance of the guidelines is voluntary and not legally
enforceable. However, they should help to ensure that the operations of these
enterprises are in harmony with national policies of the countries where they
operate and to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and
states." Id. at 970.
225. Id. at 972.
226. Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Bribery in International
Business Transactions, OECD Doc. SG/PRESS (94)36 (1994).
227. Id. The OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions held a special meeting in November 1996 with private sector and
non-governmental organizations, including the ICC and TI, in order to obtain their
views and reactions to the OECD anti-corruption activities in advance of the
review of the 1994 Recommendation. A number of international organizations
including the Council of Europe, the OAS, the IMF, and the World Bank also
participated as observers.
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1997.228 The CIME report encouraged adoption of anti-bribery
laws similar to the United States' FCPA.2 29  The Revised
Recommendation also urged "that Member countries should
criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials in an effective
and co-ordinated manner by submitting proposals to their
legislative bodies by 1 April 1998, in conformity with the agreed
common elements .... 112o
Eventually, on December 17, 1997, the twenty-nine
members23 1 of the OECD, along with five non-members, 2 32
signed the OECD Convention.2 33 The Convention came into
effect on February 15, 1999, following Canada's deposit of the
instrument of ratification. 23 4 The OECD Convention is not self-
228. Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, May 23, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1016 [hereinafter
Revised Recommendation]. Prior to this, the OECD had adopted a
recommendation regarding the tax deductibility of bribes in 1996.
Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductablity of Bribes to Foreign Public
Officials, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20 (1998).
The Revised Recommendation preserved the general undertaking of the 1994
text to combat bribery of foreign public officials but, in addition, elaborated on
specific commitments to the criminalization of bribery of foreign public officials,
accounting, and public procurement based on the conclusions of the Working
Group. Revised Recommendation, supra, art. II(i), (iii), (v), at 1019. The most
important contribution of the Revised Recommendations, however, was the
inclusion of an annex entitled Agreed Common Elements of Criminal Legislation and
Related Action. Id. annex, at 1023. These Agreed Common Elements included a
defmition of bribery and foreign public official, as well as the ancillary elements
and offenses that should be included in a model law. Id.
229. The CIME report noted that the FCPA addresses precisely the type of
bribery that the Revised Recommendation addresses. OECD Actions to Fight
Corruption, § I, para. 5, OECD Doc. C/Min(97)17 (May 26-27, 1997).
230. Revised Recommendation, supra note 228, art. III, at 1019.
231. Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
[South] Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. OECD, Membership, at http://www.oecd.org/about/
general/member-countries.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2000).
232. Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the Slovak Republic. OECD,
Welcome to the OECD Anti-Corruption Unit, at http://www.oecd.org/daf/
nocorruption/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2000).
233. Id. See also Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)16/FINAL
(1997) [hereinafter Convention on Combating Bribery].
234. Under the ratification provision of the OECD Convention, the
Convention "enter[ed] into force on the sixtieth day following the date upon which
five of the 10 countries with the largest share of OECD exports, representing at
least 60% of the combined total exports of those 10 countries, have deposited
their instruments of acceptance, approval, or ratification." OECD, Welcome to the
OECD Anti-Corruption Unit, supra note 232. Canada deposited its instrument on
December 17, 1998, thereby becoming the fifth country in this category to do so.
Id. Other countries that had already deposited instruments of ratification of the
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executing, and it does not include a model law. Rather, it
provides only rough guidelines for its implementing legislation.
The aim is that the signatories, by national implementation, will
provide clear and detailed rules that are functionally equivalent to
one another in punishing and deterring bribery in international
business.2 35 In fact, the Commentaries to the OECD Convention
provide that "[t]his Convention seeks to assure a functional
equivalence among the measurers taken by the Parties to
sanction bribery of foreign public officials, without requiring
uniformity or changes in fundamental principles of a Party's legal
system."23 6 In view of the functional equivalency approach, there
is little the OECD Convention requires Member States to do in
their implementing legislation other than criminalize bribery of
foreign public officials.
2 37
There are only five provisions that such implementing
legislation must contain in order to comply with the terms of the
OECD Convention. First, such legislation must criminalize
"active bribery"238 of foreign public officials for a business
purpose. Specifically, Article 1 requires signatory states to:
[T]ake such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a
criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer,
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether
OECD Convention included Iceland, Japan, Germany, Hungary, the United
States, Finland, and the United Kingdom. Id.
235. Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, cmt. 2, OECD Doc.
DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20 (1998) [hereinafter Commentaries on the Convention on
Combating Bribery].
236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. Even with regard to this requirement, however, the OECD Convention
allows for diversity of implementation by nationals and does not necessarily
require duplication of the FCPA by other signatory nations. In fact, under the
OECD Convention, "a statute prohibiting the bribery of agents generally which
does not specifically address bribery of a foreign public official" and a statute like
the FCPA that is specifically limited to the bribery of foreign public officials both
could be in compliance with the Convention. Id. cmt. 3.
238. The Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery provide:
This Convention deals with what, in the law of some countries, is called
"active corruption" or "active bribery," meaning the offence committed by
the person who promises or gives the bribe, as contrasted with "passive
bribery," the offence committed by the official who receives the bribe. The
Convention does not utilise the term "active bribery' simply to avoid it
being misread by the non-technical reader as implying that the briber has
taken the initiative and the recipient is a passive victim. In fact, in a
number of situations, the recipient will have induced or pressured the
briber and will have been, in that sense, the more active.
Id. cmt. 1.
LEGACY OF GEOGRAPHICAL MORALITY
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, 2 3 9 for
that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or
refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties,
in order to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage2 4 0 in the conduct of international business .... 241
Second, the OECD Convention requires signatories to ensure that
their implementing legislation makes the amount of the bribe, as
well as any proceeds or property resulting from the bribe, subject
to seizure or sanctions of comparable effect.24 2  Third, the
implementing legislation must establish jurisdiction over the
bribery of foreign public officials when the offense is committed in
whole or in part in that nation's territory.2 43 If the country's
legislation recognizes nationality jurisdiction at all, nationality
jurisdiction must also be recognized with regard to bribery of
foreign public officials. 2 44 Fourth, the country must assure
extradition or prosecution of its nationals for the bribery of a
foreign public official, if not otherwise available. 2 45  Fifth,
signatories must provide a range of penalties for bribery of foreign
public officials "comparable to that applicable to . .. bribery" of
domestic public officials. 246 In those countries where criminal
239. The OECD Convention defines a "foreign public official" as "any person
holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether
appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign country,
including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a
public international organisation." Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note
233, art. I (4)(a). Unlike the FCPA, political party officials; persons considered for
election, appointment, or in opposition; and individuals and entities in the private
sector are excluded from the definition of "foreign public official." Compare id.
with 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1997). The term "public enterprises" as used in the
OECD Convention includes "any enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over
which a government, or governments, may, directly or indirectly, exercise
dominant influence." Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery, supra
note 235, cmt. 14. A dominant influence over government is de facto established
"when the government or governments hold the majority of the enterprise's
subscribed capital, control the majority of votes attaching to shares issued by the
enterprise or can appoint a majority of the members of the enterprise's
administrative or managerial body or supervisory board." Id. Under the OECD
Convention, so long as a "public enterprise," as defined, receives some sort of
governmental assistance such as preferential subsidies, the officials of that public
enterprise are deemed to perform a public office. Id. cmt. 15.
240. The Commentaries provide that "other improper advantage" refers to
"something to which the company concerned was not clearly entitled, for example,
an operating permit for a factory which fails to meet the statutory requirements.'
Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 235, cmt. 5.
241. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 233, art. I, para. 1.
242. Id. art. 3.
243. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
244. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
245. Id. art. 10, para. 3.
246. Id. art. 3, para. 1.
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liability is not applicable to legal persons, the implementing
legislation must ensure that such legal persons are subject to
"effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions,
including monetary sanctions .. ."247 Beyond the foregoing, the
OECD Convention contains only non-mandatory provisions, that
is, provisions that should be implemented only to the extent
allowed under domestic laws.2 48 As of June 2000 twenty-three
countries had passed national legislation adopting the OECD
Convention and had deposited these laws with the OECD
Secretariat.249
The OECD Convention secures the role of the OECD in
implementing and monitoring the Convention by requiring the
notification of the Secretary General of the OECD in cases of
conflict of jurisdiction, mutual legal assistance, and extradition,
as well as making the office of the Secretary-General a "channel
of communication for these matters" among countries.250 In
addition, the OECD Convention requires signatory states to
cooperate in monitoring its full implementation through the
OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises (CIME) Working Group on Bribery in International
Business Transactions. 25'
CIME has dedicated itself to monitoring the ratification and
implementation of the Convention in two distinct phases, the first
of which "assesses [the] conformity of implementing legislation
247. Id. art. 3, para. 2.
248. For example, Article 1 requires signatories to make attempt and
conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official a criminal offense "to the same extent
as attempt and conspiracy to bribe" a domestic public official is a crime under the
national laws of the signatory. Id. art. 1, para. 2. Article 2 provides that "[e]ach
Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal
principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign
public official." Id. art. 2 (emphasis added). Commentaries to Article 2 further
elaborate this tolerance for diversity in legal systems: "In the event that, under
the legal system of a Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal
persons, that Party shall not be required to establish such criminal
responsibility." Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note
235, cmt. 20 (emphasis added).
249. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and the United States. See Anti-Corruption Unit, Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Steps Taken and Planned Future Actions by Each
Participating Country to Rafffy and Implement the Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/annex2.htm (last modified Oct. 13, 2000).
The United States implemented the OECD Convention through the International
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, which amended the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. H.R. 4353, 105th Cong. (1998).
250. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 233, art. 11.
251. Id. art. 12.
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with the Convention."25 2 As part of phase one, the Working
Group has composed reports and evaluations2 53 on each of the
countries that have ratified the Convention and "have legislation
to implement the Convention in national law."25 4 Summarizing
the results of these reports, the Working Group has concluded
that "[i]n general, countries have made laudable efforts to ensure
that national implementing legislation satisfies the obligations of
the Convention" and that "there is overall compliance with the
Convention's obligations in the great majority of countries." 2 SS
The second phase of the OECD monitoring process will
"focus on application of laws in practice,"2 5 6 as well as the
correction of certain deficiencies in the implementation process
defmed during the first phase.26 7 It is the intention of the
Working Group to "soon launch Phase 2 monitoring to study the
structures in place to enforce the laws and rules implementing
the Convention and to assess their application in practice."25 8
This is especially important given the diversity of implementing
legislation allowed under the "functional equivalency"
principle.2 5 9
252. Report by the CIME: Implementation of the Convention on Bribery in
International Business Transactions and the 1997 Revised Recommendation, para.
2, at 3, OECD Doc. C/MIN(2000)8 (June 21, 2000) [hereinafter Report by the
CIMEI.
253. Anti-Corruption Unit, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Country Reports (June 27, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.
org/daf/nocorruption/report.htm (last modified Oct. 5, 2000). The Report by the
CIME provides:
The principal objective of Phase 1 of the monitoring procedure is to
evaluate whether the legal texts through which participants implement the
Convention meet the standards set by the Convention. Phase 1 includes:
(i) preparation of the consultation in the Working Group, including a reply
to a questionnaire by the examined country and preparation of a
provisional report on the country's performance; (ii) consultation in the
Working Group[;] (iii) adoption by the Working Group of a report, including
an evaluation, on the examined country's performance.
Report by the CIME, supra note 252, para. 9, at 7.
254. Report by the CIME, supra note 252, para. 5, at 6. See also id. para. 10,
at 4 ("ITihis year, in response to a growing number of inquiries from non-
members, the Working Group adopted procedures for participation in the Working
Group and the Convention.").
255. Id. para. 3, at 3.
256. Id. para. 2, at 3.
257. Id. para. 3, at 3.
258. Id. para. 4, at 3.
259. See id. para. 16, at 9 (mentioning that potential problems include
'exceptions to the scope of application of the offence of bribery of foreign public
officials which were not foreseen by the Convention and defences which go beyond
general defences in penal codes and which could be used to circumvent liability by
a defendant.").
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B. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Anti-Corruption Initiatives
The ratifications of the OAS and OECD Conventions are a
tribute to the success of the current anti-corruption discourse,
which has rejected, at long last, the rule of geographical morality.
The governments of the North, by criminalizing the payment of
bribes by their own nationals, including multinational
corporations, have finally acknowledged that their nationals are
also corrupt and responsible in part for corruption in the South.
The OAS Convention is significant in that it successfully
incorporates voices from the South into the current anti-
corruption discourse. This is significant given the failure of main
North-South anti-corruption initiatives, such as the Draft
Convention. The failure of that Draft Convention can legitimately
be attributed primarily to the legacy of the rule of geographical
morality, including the distrust it engendered between the North
and South.2 60 The ratification of the OAS Convention indicates
that the current discourse has been able to achieve a North-
South consensus, at least in the Americas.
One should not overestimate the success, however, of the
OECD and OAS Conventions in overcoming the legacy of the rule
of geographical morality. Both conventions are regional
initiatives, not global ones.2 6 1 The United Nations, which is
representative of the nations around the world, has been able to
issue only a declaration against corruption and a Code of
Conduct for Public Officials, neither of which is binding. In
addition, there are real concerns about whether the OECD and
OAS Conventions can be successfully implemented. The ability of
the OECD Convention to overcome the rule of geographical
morality will depend on the successful implementation of the
principle of "functional equivalency," a difficult task. More
important, to date, the OAS Convention has not been
implemented by any of its signatories. Of particular concern is
the U.S. refusal to ratify it, which may diminish the motivation of
other signatories to implement its provisions. This refusal
threatens the viability of the OAS Convention as the only North-
South convention against corruption.2 6 2
260. The Group of 77 pushed for the adoption of a Code of Conduct for
transnational corporations because for centuries they had been victims of the rule
of geographical morality.
261. It should be noted, however, that both Conventions are open to
adoption and ratification by non-members.
262. Unfortunately, the opposition to the OAS Convention in the U.S.
Congress threatens this important North-South agreement. To date, the OAS
Convention has not been ratified by the United States. Senator Jesse Helms,
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It should also be mentioned that the OAS Convention is a
reflection of a North-South consensus in the Americas. Remarks
by government officials from other regions of the South, however,
indicate that the legacy of the rule of geographical morality is
alive and well in the form of distrust that such a legacy
engenders. For example, in 1996 the Indonesian Trade and
Industry Minister stated that any attempts to introduce
corruption into the agenda of the WTO [World Trade Organization]
"would be detrimental to the functioning of the WTO .... "263
Also that year, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad, requested that the WTO Ministerial meeting in
Singapore exclude corruption and other non-trade issues from
the Ministerial agenda.2 6 4 This sentiment is echoed by Cesar
Bautista, the Philippine Undersecretary for Trade and Industry
that same year, who stated that the problem of corruption can be
adequately addressed by a "simple code of conduct" among the
United States, the European Union and Japan-the "top three
international investors."2 6s Mr. Bautista objected to the current
anti-corruption discourse by stating that "globalization has
created a global economy[;] [h]owever, it has not removed the
nation states separated by unique cultures and traditions which
must be respected by individual governments." 26 6
C. Overcoming the Legacy of Geographical Morality?
The current anti-corruption discourse cannot escape the
legacy of "geographical morality" that was the hallmark of
colonial rule. The principle of geographical morality was used by
the moralists during the colonial era to justify acts of corruption
in the colonies. During the colonial period, Europeans, such as
Warren Hastings, who habitually engaged in corrupt acts,
including bribery and extortion, argued that they were compelled
to act corruptly because of the low and immoral standards of
Chair of the Committee on Foreign Relations, has stated that he cannot support
the OAS Convention because "the OAS Convention does not rise to the same level
of protection found in U.S. law or required by the OECD treaty." Letter from Jesse
Helms, Chairman, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to
Michael Hughes (Aug. 11, 1999) (on file with author).
263. Richard T. DeGeorge, Ethics, Corruption, and Doing Business in Asia,
ASIA PACIFIC J. ECON. & Bus., June 1997, at 39.
264. Chua Yew Kay, PM: Don't Use WTO Meeting to Discuss Other Issues, THE
STAR ONLINE, Nov. 13, 1996, at http://st-www.cs.uiuc.edu/-chai/berita/961103-
961203/0050.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2000).
265. Gary G. Yerkey, Philppines Rejects U.S. Proposal for WTO Accord on
Bribery, Corruption, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, May 22, 1996, available at LEXIS,
Secondary Legal Library, BNAITD File.
266. Id.
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conduct in the colonies. 26 7 On the other hand, during the post-
colonial period, relying on the revisionist discourse on corruption,
the private interests in the North that engaged in bribery in the
South defended their acts, if at all, in the name of development
and tolerance for local cultures and values. As a result, from the
colonial period to the present, the corruption discourse has been
used primarily to justify exploitation of the South by the North,
first by colonial administrations and then by multinational
corporations.
This conclusion is supported by observations of George
Moody-Stuart, an international businessman with thirty years of
experience in the area, who recently wrote:
Grand corruption 2 6 8 tends to be seen by people in the North, who
are involved in overseas development, as something with which
they have to live in the South. Men whose worst crimes in their own
countries may be speeding on a motorway or carrying an extra bottle
through customs find themselves tacitly (or even actively) conniving in
dishonest acts involving, in some cases, millions of dollars. Not
surprisingly, they see the countries of the South as being
responsible for this nastiness .... 269
This comment is strikingly reminiscent of the observation Burke
made in 1788 about Warren Hastings and others like him, which
inspired Burke's formulation of "geographical morality."2 70
Similarly, the rule of geographical morality was supported as
recently as 1994 by Lord Young, the former Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry of the United Kingdom and, at the time,
Chairman of Cable & Wireless PLC:
The moral problem for me is simply jobs. Now when you're talking
about kick-backs, you're talking about something that's illegal in
this country, and that, of course, you wouldn't dream of doing. I
haven't even heard of one case in all my business life of anybody in
this country doing things like that. But there are parts of the world
I've been to where we all know it happens. And if you want to be in
business you have to do-not something that is morally wrong,
because in some parts of the world... that's not immoral or corrupt.
It is very different from our practice and would be totally wrong in
our environment but wasn't wrong in their environment; and what
we must be very careful of is not to insist that our practices are
followed everywhere in the world.
2 7 1
267. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
268. George Moody-Stuart defines "grand corruption" as "large-scale bribery
of ministers and officials" usually at the highest level of government. MOODY-
STUART, supra note 6, at v.
269. Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added).
270. Burke, supra note 7, at 447.
271. MOODY-STUART, supra note 6, app.3, at 93 (citing Talking Politics (BBC
radio broadcast, Apr. 1994)) (emphasis added).
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As the words of Lord Young indicate, centuries after the trial of
Warren Hastings, a British politician can still invoke the principle
of "geographical morality," justified this time by unwillingness to
impose "Western values" on the rest of the world and by respect
for other cultures and value systems.
Viewed in a historical context, then, it is understandable that
the South should approach the current crusade against
transnational corruption and bribery with skepticism and ask the
following questions: How is the current anti-corruption discourse
different from the old moralist and revisionist discourses on
corruption? Will the current anti-corruption discourse, once
again, help the North exploit the South? Is the current anti-
corruption campaign really aimed at solving the problem of
corruption in the South, or is it another attempt by the North to
gain an economic advantage?
Those involved in the anti-corruption campaign must be
ready to answer such questions. The current anti-corruption
discourse can distinguish itself from the past by arguing that it
has rejected the principle of geographical morality and its
attendant worldview. A tangible expression of rejection of that
principle is the ratification of the OECD Convention, which would
require companies and legal persons in the North to apply the
same standard of behavior to their dealings in the South as they
do at home.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The impeachment and acquittal of Warren Hastings and its
aftermath serve as a concrete manifestation of the historical link
between the corruption discourse and colonial rule. Warren
Hastings, who had invoked the principle of geographical morality
to justify acts of corruption including bribery, was acquitted of all
charges. He continued to live a respectable life in England and
was even awarded an honorary doctorate from Oxford University
in 1813.272 The Indians who had served under him, however,
were not as fortunate. They were systematically purged from
positions of authority within the Company and in the colonial
administration as part of the anti-corruption reform movement.
While many Englishmen who had served under Hastings were
also removed from their positions of authority on charges of
corruption, this did not preclude other Europeans, including
272. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 393. The only tangible punishment that
Hastings may have suffered, it has been argued, was that he "never received the
peerage his position as governor-general led him to expect." Id. at 416.
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other Englishmen, from serving in the same positions. 273 This
was mainly a result of the view that an Englishman's corrupt acts
were not seen as integral to his racial, ethnic or cultural make
up. 274 In other words, by adhering to a racist world view the
post-Hastings anti-corruption reforms perpetuated the rule of
geographical morality instead of condemning it.
The revisionists attempted to overcome the legacy of
geographical morality by rejecting the moral angle of corruption,
even arguing that what we call corruption is nothing more than
"violation[s] of Western norms."275 Unfortunately, this approach
failed to separate the anti-corruption discourse from its colonial
heritage. The amorality of the revisionist approach to corruption
allowed transnational corporations and others to hide behind
cultural relativism in order to justify their involvement in corrupt
acts, including bribery of public officials in the former colonies.
Current scholarship has rejected the revisionist hypothesis
discussed in Part II. As stated in Part IV, recent multilateral
initiatives against corruption reject cultural relativism. These
initiatives and other assertions of universality, however, cannot
overcome the deep-rooted distrust that has been created and
sustained by the historical link between the topic of corruption-
including anti-corruption discourse-and the continued
exploitation of the South by the North. In order for the current
anti-corruption movement to succeed, it must not perpetuate the
legacy of the rule of geographical morality by adhering to its
divisive and racist world view. The first step toward that goal is
developing an awareness of the historical context within which
the current anti-corruption activists must operate, an awareness
that this Article has hoped to promote.
273. 2 SPEAR, supra note 65, at 95 (Cornwallis was of the view that his own
countrymen could also be corrupt, but he saw a cure for the English whereas he
could not see one for the Indians.)
274. Id. See generally 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA, supra note 63, at
433-61.
275. Caiden & Caiden, supra note 76, at 304.
